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CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW IN CONTRACTS OF 
ADHESION AND PARTY AUTONOMY 
Mo Zhang* 
INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the concept of “contracts of adhesion” was introduced 
into the legal vocabulary in the United States in the early 20th century,1 
it has been widely used to refer to the standard contracts or standard 
form contracts in which the terms are drafted and presented by one party 
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis,2 and the other party’s participation consists 
*  Associate Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law.  The author would like to 
thank Professor Jacques deLesile of the University of Pennsylvania School of Law for his valuable 
advice, and Professors William Ewald and Kermit Roosevelt of the University Pennsylvania School 
of Law for their comments and inputs on an earlier draft. 
 1. See Edwin Patterson, The Delivery of A Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 
(1919) (addressing the issue of freedom of contract in life insurance contracts, Patterson pointed out 
that life-insurance contracts were contracts of “adhesion” because in these cases, the contract was 
drawn up by the insurer and the insured, who merely “adhered” to it, and had little choice as to its 
terms.  Patterson then suggested that this expressive term seemed worthy of a place in our legal 
vocabulary).  The concept of the contract of adhesion is not an American product, but rather 
originated in French civil law and was adopted by a majority of American courts after the 
Califorinia Supreme Court endorsed adhesion in 1962.  See Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 58 
Cal. 2d 862, 882 (Cal. 1962) (reciting history of the concept). 
 2. See Todd Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
1174, 1177 (1982).  Rakoff tried to define the term “adhesion contract” by spelling out the 
following seven characteristics of an adhesion contract: (1) the document whose legal validity is at 
issue is a printed out form that contains many terms and clearly purports to be a contract; (2) the 
form has been drafted by, or on behalf of, one party to the transaction; (3) the drafting party 
participates in numerous transactions of the type represented by the form and enters into these 
transactions as a matter of routine; (4) the form is presented to the adhering party with the 
representation that, except perhaps for a few identified items (such as the price term), the drafting 
party will enter into the transaction only on the terms contained in the document.  This 
representation may be explicit or may be implicit in the situation, but it is understood by the 
adherent; (5) after the parties have dickered over whatever terms are open to bargaining, document 
is signed by the adherent; (6) the adhering party enter into few transactions of the type represented 
by the form – few, at least in comparison with the drafting party; and (7) the principle of obligation 
of the adhering party in the transaction considered as a whole is payment of the money.  Id. 
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of his mere “adherence” to the terms given.3  It may not be logical to say 
that all standard contracts are necessarily adhesive, but all adhesion 
contracts use standard (or pre-printed) forms.  In this sense, contracts of 
adhesion and standard contracts quite often are interchangeably used to 
mean the contracts that are formed through a fine-print form prepared by 
one party in advance. 
The very nature of contracts of adhesion is that a contract as such is 
not a product of bargaining because it contains the pre-printed terms of 
one-sided control.4  The economic impetus for the development of 
contracts of adhesion is the need for uniformity of contract terms that 
deal with the same products or services of the company in mass 
production and distribution and to help reduce possible risks facing the 
company under the terms of a contract.5  On this ground, the economic 
analysis in favor of standard contracts argues that the use of standard 
contracts may make both sellers and buyers better off6 because it is 
assumed, in a perfectly functioning market with complete information, 
that contracts will contain only efficient terms and the seller’s contract 
terms will benefit buyers as a class.7  Thus, it is suggested that in the 
absence of external irregularities, the standard contracts shall be 
considered presumptively enforceable.8 
Economic reason aside, the obvious practical importance of the use 
of standard contracts to sellers or firms is self-protection or minimization 
of possible risk.9  It is typical that, when drafting contracts, the firms, 
through their lawyers, will try every effort to prevent others from 
possibly intruding into the interest of the firms, and will only consider 
how the firms’ business interests are to be effectively protected.10  To 
that end, it would be ideal from the firms’ standpoint that the contracts 
 3. See Albert Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 
1072, 1075 (1953). 
 4. See Karl Llewellyn, Book Review on Prausnitz’s The Standardization of Commercial 
Contracts in English and Continental Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700 (1939). 
 5. See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion – Some Thoughts about Freedom of 
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 631 (1943). 
 6. See Robert Hillman & Jeffery Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracts in the Electronic 
Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 446 (2002). 
 7. Russel Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts and Unconscionability, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1208, 1216 (2003). 
 8. See id. at 1208. 
 9. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 285-286 (Aspen 4th ed. 2004). 
 10. See Edwin Richards, Drafting Licenses to Guide Whether Potential Disputes Lie in 
Contract or Infringement, 7 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 45 (2003). 
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be prepared by the firm, in a pre-printed form, and entered into with 
others on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis.11 
As a legal instrument prescribing consensual rights and obligations 
of the parties, however, a contract is not a one-sided deal.  A contract 
results from the bargain made on a free and voluntary basis between 
parties of equal footing.  For that reason, the increasing use of contracts 
of adhesion has generated considerable debate on how contracts of 
adhesion should be dealt with and what rules for such contracts are 
needed.12  For example, when handling contracts of adhesion, courts 
have a tendency to strike down the terms that are believed to be 
“unconscionable.”13  One of the major concerns is, of course, the 
possible abuse of the use of standard contracts that are adhesive. 
A recent development that has caused a considerable amount of 
controversies is the vast use of contracts of adhesion in the stream of e-
commerce conducted on the Internet.  In fact, the use of contracts of 
adhesion is becoming more frequent in e-commerce than in the 
traditional “paper world”.  The most common contract forms that are 
employed electronically are so-called “click-wrap” agreements (“click-
wraps”) and “browse-wrap” agreements (“browse-wraps”).  Click-wraps 
refer to the electronic form agreements set up by one party to which the 
other party may assent by clicking on the “I agree” icon or button or by 
typing in a set of specified words.14 
Distinct from click-wraps, browse-wraps are the electronic form 
agreements provided on the website in which the users can browse the 
terms and make a purchase or download without expressly manifesting 
assent to the terms.15  In this context, browse-wraps are also termed as 
click-free agreements.  But the terms will attach, or the users’ assent to 
the terms will be assumed, when certain actions, such as use of the 
 11. For example, in contracts such as a loan, lease, real property (sold by the builders), 
insurance, license, employment, the terms except for very few items (price/premium/salary) are not 
open for negotiations. 
 12. See Rakoff, supra note 2.  See also James White, Autistic Contract, 45 WAYNE L REV. 
1693, 1726-1731 (2000). 
 13. See Batya Goodman, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the Customers: The Shrink-Wrap 
Agreements as an Adhesion Contract, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 319, 329 (2000). 
 14. See Christina L. Kunz, Maureen F. Duca, Heather Thayer & Jennifer Debrow, Click-
Through Agreement: Strategies for Avoiding Disputes on Validity of Assent, 57 BUS. LAW. 401 
(2002) [hereinafter referred to as Kunz, et al., Click-Through Agreement]. 
 15. See Christina L. Kunz, John E. Ottaviani, Elaine D. Ziff, Juliet M. Moringillo, Kathleen 
M. Porter, & Jennifer C. Debrow, Browse-Wrap Agreements: Validity of Implied Assent in 
Electronic Form Agreements, 59 BUS. LAW. 279 (2003) [hereinafter referred to as Kunz et al., 
Browse-Wrap Agreements]. 
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website or installation of software, are performed by the users.16  In 
many cases, a “terms and conditions” hyperlink is placed somewhere on 
the web page that offers to sell goods or services and the hyperlink is 
normally hard to be noticed by any but the most cautious user.17 
Another type of contract that is deemed adhesive and appears 
controversial as well involves “shrink-wrap” agreements.  In the 
physical world, “shrink-wrap agreements” means the form agreements 
imposed in the retail software package that are covered in plastic or 
cellophane “shrink wrap.”18  The agreements normally contain written 
licenses for the use of the software that become effective as soon as the 
customer tears the wrapping from the package.  Although a majority of 
shrink-wrap agreements are related to software acquired off-the-shelf,19 
the term may also cover certain online purchases.  Because in the shrink-
wraps, the buyers (consumers) may know that terms are contained 
within the wraps at the time of purchase, but may only have the chance 
to read the terms after they open the plastic wraps, the transactions as 
such are being characterized by some as “money now, terms later” 
deals.20 
All of these “wrap” agreements may appear facially different, 
however, these agreements share many common procedural and 
substantive aspects.  First, these contracts are not entered into between 
the parties as a result of the meaningful negotiation that parties normally 
engage in during contract formation.  Second, the agreements are drafted 
and provided by one party in a “read only” format that makes it 
impossible for the other party to “pick and choose” among the rights and 
obligations, and the other party’s only choice is to “take it or leave it.”  
Third, the other party’s assent to the terms of the agreement may be 
either absent or ambiguous.  Finally, the other party’s legal 
consequences are either unknown or unpredictable.  Therefore, a 
legitimate issue is whether there is any meaningful bargained for 
exchange, essential to the validity of the contract, between the parties 
entering into a “wrap” agreement. 
An important issue this article addresses is which law will govern 
 16. See id. 
 17. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 464. 
 18. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F. 3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 19. See Goodman, supra note 13, at 320. 
 20. See Roger Bern, “Terms Later” Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and A Bad 
Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12 J. L. & POL’Y 641, 648 (2004).  
See also Christopher Pitet, Note, The Problem with “Money Now, Terms Later”: ProCD, Inc. v. 
Zeidenberg and the Enforceability of ‘Shrinkwrap” Software Licenses, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 325, 
339 (1998). 
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the “wrap” agreements, or in a broader sense, what would be the 
governing law for contracts of adhesion.  More specifically, in contracts 
of adhesion, will a choice of law clause be enforceable? As a matter of 
fact, many, if not all, “wrap” agreements contain a choice of law 
provision that subjects the rights and obligations of the parties to a 
specific law or legal system.21  An internationally accepted principle is 
that the parties to a contract have the autonomy to choose the law that 
governs their contract and the choice so made should be respected.22  
The question then is whether the choice of law clause in an adhesion 
contract that is provided by one party is a natural fruit of the autonomy 
of the parties. 
More than a half century ago, Professor Albert Ehrenzweig 
examined a number of cases that involved contracts of adhesion and 
found that the party autonomy rule was inapplicable because these 
contracts did not result from equal bargaining.  Thus, he concluded that 
in order to restore “freedom of contract,” rather than “freedom to 
adhere,” it was important to realize that “whatever the status of the 
principle of party autonomy in the conflicts law of contracts in general, 
this principle has no place in the conflicts law of adhesion contracts.”23  
Is Ehrenzweig’s observation still valid today? 
In 1991, the Supreme Court, in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 
took a position in favor of a forum selection clause in the cruise line’s 
passage contract ticket – a type of standard form contract printed on the 
back of the ticket.24  In that case, although the Court emphasized that 
forum selection clauses contained in form passage contracts were subject 
to judicial scrutiny for fundamental fairness, the Court disagreed with 
 21. For example, in a Microsoft “Window Defender License Agreement” (browsed on June 
21, 2006), the choice of law provision reads as follows: 
United States: if you acquired the software in the United States, Washington State Law governs the 
interpretation of this agreement and applies to claims for breach of it, regardless of conflict of law 
principles.  The laws of the state where you live govern all other claims, including claims under 
state consumer protection law, unfair competition law, and in tort. 
Outside United States: if you acquired software in any other country, the laws of that country apply. 
 22. See Ole Lando, Contracts, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 3 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 3 (Kurt Lipstein ed., J.C.B. Mohr 1976) (“The parties’ right to 
choose the law which governs an international contracts is so widely accepted by the countries of 
the world that it belongs to the common core of the legal systems.”).  See also U.C.C § 1-301 (1977) 
(official comments). 
 23. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 3, at 1090. 
 24. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), superceded by statute, 46 
U.S.C. App. § 183(c), as recognized in Yang v. M/V Minas Yeo, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 2235, at 
*4 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that the statute “discounts forum-selection clauses only in the passenger 
context”). 
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the court of appeals’ determination that a non-negotiated forum selection 
clause in a form ticket contract is never enforceable simply because it is 
not the subject of bargaining.25  Instead, the Court held that the forum 
selection clause in the cruse line’s passage contract ticket was reasonable 
and enforceable.  Would the Carnival ruling mean anything to the 
validity of the choice of law clause in contracts of adhesion? 
In a highly debated case, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenburg,26 decided in 
1996, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld a “shrink-
wrap” license agreement against the buyer on the ground that the 
contract may be formed in another way, that is, the contract does not 
have to be formed when the buyer paid for the box of software selected 
from the shelf of the vendor and walked out of the store, rather it may be 
formed when the buyer used the software after having an opportunity to 
read the license at leisure.27  The ProCD decision is regarded to have 
reversed the practice in the U.S. courts where shrink-wrap agreements 
were generally held invalid.28  What may the ProCD approach implicate 
in respect to the concern about the autonomy of the parties in selecting 
governing law in contracts of adhesion? 
In an attempt to promote the uniformity of the law governing 
software licenses, the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws (U.C.C.U.S.L.) in 1999 adopted the Uniform 
Computer Information Transactions Act (known as UCITA).29  The 
2002 version of UCITA, provides that the parties, in their agreement, 
may choose the applicable law.30  UCITA provisions allow the parties to 
choose the law of any state to resolve the disputes arising under the 
contract and UCITA does not require that the parties or the transaction 
have a relationship to the state whose law they select.  Could this 
provision help the parties make an autonomy-based choice of law 
decision to govern their contracts that in most cases are “wrapped?”31 
 25. See id. at 593. 
 26. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenburg 86 F. 3d 1447 (7th.Cir. 1996). 
 27. See id. at 1452. 
 28. See Step-Saver Data Sys. Inc. v. Wyse Tech. and Software Link, Inc., 939 F.2d 91 (3d 
Cir. 1991). 
 29. See UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT (2002), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/2002final.htm. 
 30. Id. § 109. 
 31. Pursuant to § 109 of UCITA, the choice of law by the parties may govern the access 
contracts and electronic delivery.  Id.  The access contract is defined to mean a contract to obtain by 
electronic means access to, or information from, an information processing system of another 
person, or the equivalent of such access.  Id.  Electronic delivery refers to electronic transfer of 
possession or control.  See id. 
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This article intends to analyze these issues from a contractual 
choice of law point of view.  The article attempts to argue that contracts 
of adhesion do not conform to the notion of autonomy that underlies the 
choice of law by the parties and is incompatible with the principle of 
mutuality on which the power of the parties to make the choice of 
applicable law rests.  The main theme of the article is to suggest that the 
choice of law clause in contracts of adhesion shall not take effect 
(although the clause may not necessarily be invalid), unless and until the 
other party (adherent) meaningfully agrees or a court scrutinizes the 
contract for the true assent of the adherent.  The article proposes and 
advocates a “second chance” approach for the contractual choice of law 
in contracts of adhesion in order to protect the adherents’ interest that 
otherwise would be adversely affected. 
Part II of this article begins with an analysis of the autonomy in 
selecting the governing law for the contract and also discusses the 
mutuality that is needed in the process of choice of law by the parties.  
Part III focuses on one-sided scenarios of contracts of adhesion, 
particularly the cohesive “wrap” agreements, and their incompatibility 
with mutuality-based autonomy in contractual choice of law.  Part IV 
provides a critical view of the doctrines employed by courts in the 
United States to deal with contracts of adhesion, with a focus on the 
issue as to whether those doctrines would, to the extent that the parties’ 
assent is truly expressed, help ensure the autonomy that the parties are 
supposed to have in making a choice of law in contracts of adhesion.  In 
Part V, the article addresses why adherents should have a “second 
chance” against an adhesive choice of law clause, and how the “second 
chance” is to be exercised. 
The article concludes in Part VI by pointing out that given its 
uniqueness, the choice of law issue should be coped with separately 
from other parts of the contract.  The basic argument is that for contracts 
of adhesion, though the time may not yet be ripe for a set of new rules to 
police the choice of law clause, adherents should not necessarily adhere 
to the choice of law made by the other party, but rather should be given a 
second chance to really make a choice, namely to either agree or 
disagree.  Thus, as a general rule, a choice of law clause in an adhesion 
contract shall be presumed ineffective; and thus, unenforceable unless 
the adherent’s true assent is confirmed. 
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AUTONOMY AND MUTUALITY: THE UNDERPINGNINGS OF 
CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW 
In conflict of law literature, contractual choice of law is premised 
on the principle known as “party autonomy.”32  The principle in its 
application has two fundamental and interrelated elements: autonomy 
and mutuality.  The central importance of party autonomy is, of course, 
the autonomy, but the exercise of the autonomy must be based on 
mutuality.  The reason is obvious: party autonomy is centered on the 
intention of the parties in freely negotiated contracts.33  Therefore, the 
autonomy as to the contractual parties must be mutual. 
Autonomy, as used in choice of law, is referred to as the freedom of 
parties to select through their agreement the law or legal system to which 
their contract is to be subject,34 or as the liberty of the parties in choice 
of law.35  The determination of choice is dependent on the intention of 
the parties and such intention may either be expressed in the form of a 
choice of law clause or choice of law agreement (express choice), or be 
implied in fact from the act of the parties (tacit choice).36  A well-
established rule in the conflict of laws is that the law chosen by the 
parties governs their contract and the choice will be respected absent 
obstacles to its enforceability.37 
The concept of autonomy is derived from the principle of freedom 
of contract.38  It is believed that by letting the parties choose which law 
governs their contract, the objectives of protecting the justified 
expectations of the parties and enabling the parties to foretell with 
 32. See WILLIS REESE & MAURICE ROSENBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS, CASES AND MATERIALS 
1 (Griswold Cheatham et al. ed., Foundation Press 8th ed. 1984). 
 33. See LANDO, supra note 22, at 6. 
 34. See id. at 3. 
 35. See Henri Batiffol, Dean of the Faculty of Law, University of Lille, France, Lecture at the 
Summer Institute on International and Comparative Law sponsored by the University of Michigan: 
Public Policy and the Autonomy of the Parties: Interrelations Between Imperative Legislation and 
the Doctrine of Party Autonomy (Aug. 12, 1949), in LECTURES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS AND 
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS DELIVERED AT THE SUMMER INSTITUTE ON INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE LAW, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, 1951, at 68, 70. 
 36. See F. Mann, The Proper Law of the Contract, 3 INT’L L. Q. 60, 60 (1950). See also 
Walter Cook, “Contracts” and the Conflict of Laws: “Intention” of the Parties, 32 ILL. L. REV. 
899, 917 (1938). 
 37. According to Professor Henri Batiffol of France, international contracts are governed 
according to the law prevailing in the greatest number of existing legal systems by a remarkable 
rule: the parties to such contracts are allowed to choose the law which will govern their transactions, 
and this rule of “party autonomy” is considered as highly satisfactory by all those who deem that 
liberty of individuals finally is the real end of law.  See Batiffol, supra note 35, at 68. 
 38. See Mann, supra note 37, at 61.  See also LANDO, supra note 22, at 15. 
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accuracy what their rights and liabilities are under the contract will be 
best attained.  The idea is that giving parties the power of choice is in 
line with the fact that persons are free, within broad limits, to determine 
their own contractual obligations.39  It follows that freedom of contract 
makes it possible for the parties to have the autonomy to determine the 
applicable law under which their contract will be governed.40 
At present, freedom of contract is believed to have a two-faceted 
meaning.  First, as has been generally proclaimed, the freedom of 
contract is the freedom of the parties to make an enforceable bargain.41  
In light of encouraging individual entrepreneurial activity, freedom of 
contract is viewed as a means to maximize the welfare of the parties and 
the good of society as a whole, and to accord to individuals a sphere of 
influence in which they can act freely.42  The universal acceptance of 
freedom of contract is premised on the belief that a contract is the 
product of free bargaining by “parties who are brought together by the 
play of market and who meet each other on a footing of social and 
economic equality” 43 and, therefore, “no threat would result from the 
freedom of contract to the social order.”44 
Second, as many have argued, is the freedom from contract.  Here, 
the issue involved is whether a party may be freed from contractual 
liability arising in the absence of affirmative assent.45  It is argued, at 
least by some, that freedom from contract is part of the human freedom 
the law wants to protect as it structures and maintains the institution of 
contract.46  Although the connotation of freedom from contract may 
contain a wide range of contract related matters, e.g. pre-contractual 
liability, an important part, which is relevant here with regard to the 
contracts of adhesion, is the freedom from the obligations that were not 
expressly negotiated. 
Whatever one may think about freedom of contract, the proposition 
that seems to be fundamental is that a contract is formed on a basis of 
 39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. e (1971). 
 40. Charles Fried argued that preserving party autonomy should be the primary goal of 
contract law.  See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE, A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION, 1, 1-2 (Harvard 1981). 
 41. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 9, at 19. 
 42. See id. at 20. 
 43. See Kessler, supra note 5, at 630. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See Omri Ben-Shahar, Forward: Freedom from Contract, 2004 WIS. L. REV 261, 263 
(2004). 
 46. See Todd Rakoff, Is “Freedom from Contract” Necessarily a Libertarian Freedom? 2004 
WIS. L. REV. 477, 477 (2004). 
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mutual assent and the assent must be manifested freely and voluntarily.47  
To achieve such an assent mutually, autonomy and mutuality are 
essential.  The most important one is, of course, the autonomy.  In 
Black’s Law Dictionary, the word “autonomy’ is defined as the right of 
self-government.  As used in contracts, autonomy denotes the power of 
the parties to dispose of their rights and obligations at will, through the 
agreements reached between them.48 
In fact, autonomy of the parties is now regarded as a common 
substitute for the traditional freedom of contract,49 and in this context, 
autonomy and freedom almost become synonymous.  It is not the 
intention of this author, however, to imply that the parties’ autonomy is 
absolute.  On the contrary, like freedom, autonomy may only be 
exercised within the boundary of law, which is not the subject of 
discussion here. 
For purposes of making a contract, the autonomy of the parties can 
be evidenced by way of both substance and procedure.  Substantively, 
the autonomy gives the parties, on a mutual basis, the freedom, among 
other things, to make or not to make the contract, to deal or not to deal 
with each other, to include or not to include in the contract certain terms 
or conditions, or to dissolve or continue their contractual relation.  Thus, 
literally speaking, the right to contract is within the private domain of 
the parties and the courts should not be in any position to make the 
contract for the parties.50  An important notion in this regard is that a 
person is supposed to know the contract that he makes.51 
Unlike the substance of autonomy that involves what a contract 
should be as between the parties, the procedural matter of autonomy 
concerns how the parties’ enter into the contract.  Because a contract is 
basically a bargained-for-exchange between the parties,52 the transaction 
requires that the parties have equal bargaining power.  Thus, 
 47. A classic view about freedom of contract is the concept of “liberty of contracting” 
described by Sir George Jessel in his judicial statement in 1875.  According to Jessel, “men of full 
age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and their contracts 
when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of 
justice.”  Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, 19 L.R.Eq. 462, 465 (V.C. 1875).  For 
general discussion about freedom of contract, see Mark Pettit, Jr. Freedom, Freedom of Contract, 
and the “Rise and Fall,” 79 B. U. L. REV. 263 (1999). 
 48. As Farnsworth points out, contract expressed “energetic self-interest,” and the law that 
governed it expressed “the nature of contract by insisting that men assert their interests, push them, 
and fight for them, if they were to have the help of the state.”  FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, at 19. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1181. 
 51. Kessler, supra note 5, at 630. 
 52. See 1 ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 157 (West 1952). 
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procedurally speaking, autonomy means that the parties freely express 
their intention and expect to get what they have bargained for without 
fear of interference from anyone.  As between the parties, procedural 
autonomy implies that no party has the ability to force the other party 
into a contract and, likewise, no party has the power to force the other 
party to accept certain terms included in the contract.53 
To the extent that the contract is a freely negotiated bargain, 
mutuality is the foundation underlying the bargain.  Mutuality not only 
serves to establish a relationship between the parties during the 
bargaining process (i.e. to make a contract), but also helps to specify the 
status of the parties as a result of bargain (e.g. promisor or promisee).54  
Because of its importance in the course of contract making, a lack of 
mutuality may render a contract void.55  Even in a unilateral contract, 
where the parties may not act in the way the parties normally do in a 
bilateral contract, mutuality may still be discernable in the sense that the 
other party (promisee) may have to satisfy a condition precedent in order 
for the contract to become effective.  Hence, it is not counter-intuitive to 
say that the mutuality, generally speaking, is indeed the spirit of 
contract. 
Although it seems difficult to precisely describe what mutuality is 
about in terms of content, mutuality may be used to indicate certain 
connections between the parties in different aspects of contract.  In one 
place, for example, mutuality is said to include mutuality of assent, 
mutuality of consideration, mutuality of remedy, and mutuality of 
obligation.56  It should be pointed out that no matter how the term is to 
be defined and classified, mutuality is a legal value that actually holds 
the parties together in a contract.  More explicitly, a mutual expression 
of assent to the same terms is a decisive factor to the formation of a 
contract.57  It may fairly be stated that because of the presence of 
mutuality between the parties, it is possible for their bargain take place. 
Thus, what seems undisputable is that without autonomy and 
mutuality, the mutual assent of the parties could not possibly exist.  And 
absent mutual assent, there would be no contract because it is commonly 
required that the mutual assent of both parties be present in order for the 
 53. See Korobkin, supra note 7, at 1205. 
 54. See BRIAN BLUM, CONTRACTS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS, 164 (Aspen 3d. ed. 
2004). 
 55. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 203 (West 4th ed. 1998). 
 56. See CORBIN, supra note 52, at 222. 
 57. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 55, § 2.1, at 25. 
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bargaining process to result in a contract.58  A stated rule is that mutual 
assent is essential to a valid contract.59  A popular metaphor that 
represents mutual assent is a “meeting of the minds,” which means that 
the parties agree on all of essential terms of the proposed transaction.  
Despite the difference in theoretical assertions about what kind of 
intention of the parties would matter in finding whether the parties have 
assented to an agreement,60 it is generally held that to form a contract, 
there must be a bargain in which manifestation of mutual assent to the 
exchange is ascertained.61 
Obviously, for contractual choice of law, autonomy and mutuality 
are of particular importance and have direct impact on the interests of 
the parties.  On the one hand, the contractual choice of law constitutes 
part of the contract by which the parties will be bound, and in the mean 
time it provides a legal basis (the applicable law) for settlement of 
possible disputes.  On the other hand, the contractual choice of law has 
the effect of subjecting the contract, as well as the parties, to a legal 
system under which the rights and obligations of the parties will be 
determined, and often the chosen legal system is that of a country 
foreign to one of the parties or even to both of them (e.g. a third country 
law).  Therefore, it is crucial that the parties exercise their autonomy on 
a mutual basis in determining which law is going to govern their 
contract. 
In choice of law, there are two theories that are aimed at 
characterizing the law chosen by the parties.  One theory is called “party 
reference.”  Pursuant to the “party reference” theory, the law chosen by 
the parties is regarded as the law of certain country or jurisdiction 
referred by the parties in their contract.62  Then, when making their 
choice of law the parties submit their contract to the chosen forum.63  
The other theory is known as “incorporation.”  Under the 
“incorporation” theory, to choose an applicable law by the parties is 
actually to incorporate the law of a chosen country or jurisdiction into 
 58. See Samuel Williston, Mutual Assent in the Formation of Contracts, 14 ILL. L. R. 85 
(1920). 
 59. Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522 (Va. 1954). 
 60. There are two different doctrines that affect the determination of the intention of the 
parties, namely subjective doctrine and objective doctrine.  Under the subjective doctrine, only the 
actual intention of the parties counts.  The objective doctrine takes an opposite view that looks only 
to the external appearance of the parties’ intention or apparent intention.  For more discussion about 
the two doctrines, see Farnsworth, supra note 9, at 114-17. 
 61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981). 
 62. See Lando, supra note 22, at 13. 
 63. See id. 
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the contract, and make it as a provision of the contract.64  Pursuant to 
either theory, the autonomy and mutuality of the parties is deemed to be 
essential to making a choice of law for a contract. 
The importance of autonomy and mutuality to the choice of law by 
the parties is also underscored by the “independence” of the choice of 
law.  Here, the “independence” means that the choice of law clause or 
agreement is generally separated from the rest of the contract, especially 
when the validity of the contract becomes an issue.  For instance, if for 
some reason the contract is deemed invalid under the forum’s laws, it 
may not necessarily render the choice of law clause or agreement invalid 
because the law chosen by the parties may have to be applied to 
determine, for example, the possible remedies of the parties, particularly 
when one party already received the benefit of the bargain from other 
party’s performance.65  The “independence” of the choice of law clause 
is also relevant if the contract becomes illegal according to the lex loci 
contractus (law of place of contract), but may still be enforceable under 
the law chosen by the parties.  In this situation, there is a rule that the 
applicable law chosen by the parties will control.66 
To ensure that the parties have autonomy with regard to the choice 
of law in contract, and are able to deal with each other mutually, four 
issues need to be addressed.  The first issue concerns whether the parties 
are brought together for the contract voluntarily and are willing to deal 
with each other without coercion.  The second issue involves whether 
 64. Section 187 (1) of the Conflict of Laws Restatement (2nd) adopts the incorporation theory 
by providing that “the law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and 
duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could have resolved by an 
explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 187(1) (1988 revisions).  In the official comments on Section 187(1), it is further stated that 
“[t]he rule of this Subsection is a rule providing for incorporation by reference and is not a rule of 
choice of law. . . .In the alternative, they may incorporate into the contract by reference extrinsic 
material which may, among other things, be the provisions of some foreign law.”  Id. at cmt. c. 
 65. In English private international law literature, a popular term indicating the law applicable 
to the contract is called the “proper law of contract,” which is defined as the law which the English 
or other court is to apply in determining the obligations under the contract.  See CHESHIRE & 
NORTH, CHESHIRE’S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 197 (Butterworth 8th ed. 1970).  The 
subjective theory of the proper law regards the proper law as the legal system, which by their 
express or implied selection, the parties intend to apply.  See F. Mann, supra note 36, at 60. 
 66. In English courts, for example, a contact that is valid by its proper law does not become 
unenforceable in England merely due to the illegality of the contract under the law of the place 
where the contract was made.  See CHESHIRE & NORTH, supra note 65, at 226.  Also, in China, for 
example, under 1999 Chinese Contract Law, if a contract is null and void, revoked or terminated, 
the validity of the dispute settlement clause which independently exists in the contract shall not be 
affected.  See Article 57, Contract Law of China, available at 
http://cclaw.net/lawandregulations/chinese_contract_law.txt. 
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there is a fair bargain between the parties and whether the bargain is 
based on free negotiation.  The third issue deals with whether there is 
assent from the parties and whether the parties mutually manifest their 
assent.  The fourth issue is whether the parties intend to have a certain 
law govern the contract and whether the application of that law, as well 
as the result of such application, are within the parties’ reasonable 
expectations.  A negative answer to any of these issues may cast serious 
doubt with respect to the parties’ autonomy and mutuality. 
In a freely negotiated contract that contains a choice of law clause, 
or in a freely negotiated choice of law agreement, a general assumption 
is that the autonomy and mutuality of the parties is fully or adequately 
exercised.  But, in contracts of adhesion, both autonomy and mutuality 
are always the issue.  It is not only because the presence of adhesion 
affects the contracting parties, as well as the contracting process, but 
also because such contracts are hardly made on a mutual basis and to a 
great extent reflect the autonomy of one party, and one party only. 
CONTRACTS OF ADHESION AND “WRAPS”: A DEFECTIVE BARGAIN AND 
ONE-SIDED AUTONOMY 
The traditional dogma of contract contains at least two basic 
factors, promise and exchange, which are the prerequisites for the 
existence of a contract.  Promise is a commitment to a future act or non-
act.  Or in more technical words, it is “a manifestation of intention to act 
or refrain from acting in a specific way, so made as to justify a promisee 
in understanding that a commitment has been made.”67  Exchange refers 
to a mutual dealing by which one party gets what he wants and gives the 
other party what is asked in return.  Simply put, exchange is a process of 
bargaining where you give me that which I want and I give you that 
which you want.68  Thus, once the parties exchange promises (bilateral) 
or when one party makes a promise and the other party agrees to 
perform in a particular manner (unilateral), a contract is formed 
(assuming that the promise is enforceable). 
Making a promise is an exercise of the autonomy of the promisor 
because the promisor decides whether to make the promise, what 
toinclude in the promise, and to whom he will make the promise.  
Equally, acceptance depends on the autonomy of the promisee.  The 
promisee’s exchange of a promise with the promisor implies mutuality 
 67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1979). 
 68. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 9, at 6. 
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because the parties involved will benefit from the promises they have 
made to the other as a result of exchange.  To guarantee that the parties 
get the benefit of their voluntary bargain, it is critical that there is a full 
exercise of autonomy as between the parties and that there is a bargain 
and the bargain is freely made.  One important determinant, as often 
used by the courts, is whether the parties have equal bargaining power. 
Like other contract terms, a contractual choice of law by the parties 
is also a bargain.  Although the choice of law clause itself may not be a 
promise, it closely relates to the promise in that the chosen governing 
law will determine how the promise is to be enforced (contract 
performance), what the promise actually means (interpretation), and the 
resulting legal consequences if either party breaches the agreement 
(remedies).  Therefore, it is very common that each party prefers to 
choose the law with which the party is most familiar.  But as an outcome 
of a bargain, the applicable law that is chosen may be the law of the state 
or country of the promisor, the law of the state or country of the 
promisee, or the law of a neutral and unrelated state or country, which is 
not necessarily the law either party desires.  In some cases, an 
international treaty may be selected to govern the contract.  In other 
cases, the device of dépeçage (meaning to subject the different aspects 
of the contract to different legal systems) may be employed to try to 
satisfy the different needs of the parties.69 
Contracts of adhesion, however, significantly alter the traditional 
process of contract formation.  Here, a meaningful bargain between the 
parties does not exist.  In an adhesion contract, the parties barely 
negotiate.  In most cases, as noted, the terms and conditions that are 
presented to adherents are pre-printed and are basically non-negotiable.  
It is true that the contract, though adhesive, may not be formed without 
the signature of an adherent or other form indicating the adherent’s 
consent.  But, it does not necessarily mean that the adherent has full 
knowledge of the terms in the contract or the adherent will get what he 
has bargained for.  The lack of a meaningful bargain between the parties 
or the lack of an opportunity by the parties to bargain, leaves the 
adherent in the position that he either accept the deal without changing 
any contractual terms or conditions, or there is no deal at all. 
As a general pattern, what is obvious is that contracts of adhesion 
often take place where the bargaining power of the parties is unbalanced, 
where the supply of certain products or services is scarce, where 
adherents have special needs and the market is being monopolized in a 
 69. See LANDO, supra note 22, at 8. 
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certain way, or where the market force clearly disfavors adherents.70  In 
these circumstances, adherents normally do not have the leverage to 
bargain or to make an effective bargain.  Of course, there are some other 
situations where standard terms result in an adhesive contract.  For 
example, standard terms may result in an adhesive contract when a form 
contract is long and full of legal jargon, making the contract terms too 
complicated to be understood, and the adherent is in hurry.71 
But, “wrap” agreements in the electronic form do not seem to 
follow this pattern.  As a matter of fact, “wrap” agreements take a form 
that is unrelated to the actual status of adherents.  In other words, the 
“wrap” agreements are generally used in terms of scope in the contract 
making process.  For example, the unbalanced bargaining power of the 
parties may not be attributable to the adhesive nature of the contract.  
One peculiar characteristic of “wrap” agreements is that there is neither 
face-to-face dealing between the parties, nor negotiation between the 
parties, because everything is computerized through a well-designed 
software program that does not allow e-consumers to interact with the 
other party or a live agent of the other party.72  Consequently, “wrap” 
agreements appear to be, at least facially, more adhesive because 
adherents have no opportunity to bargain for anything or to make a 
bargain. 
Clearly then, as a party to an adhesion contract, an adherent is 
basically placed in a “no bargain” situation, and in many cases the 
adherent may only passively accept whatever is being offered and would 
have to bear whatever obligation is being imposed.  Thus, it is highly 
questionable in a contract as such whether there is an exercise of 
autonomy, particularly with regard to the adherent.  The issue further 
arising from this situation would be whether the parties have actually 
reached mutual assent as to the major terms and conditions of a contract 
or, in short, whether the adherent has truly assented to those terms and 
conditions. 
 70. See Kessler, supra note 5, at 632. 
 71. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 435.  It has also been pointed out that there is 
one additional aspect of the situation that forms part of the popular conception of the contract of 
adhesion: the adhering party is in practice unlikely to have read the standard terms before signing 
the document and is unlikely to have understood them if he has read them.  See also Rakoff, supra 
note 2, at 1179. 
 72. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 7, at 468. 
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A.  Inherent Defect in Adhesion Contracts: Lack of Meaningful 
Bargain 
A rudimentary concept of contract is that contractual liability is 
consensual.73  Stemming from this concept is the settled legal principle 
that the formation of a contract requires the mutual assent of the 
parties.74  The parties must manifest mutual assent during the bargaining 
process in order to form a contract.75  Although, as noted, contract 
theorists have long debated whether the parties’ assent should be 
determined subjectively or objectively,76 the presence of the parties’ 
assent, measured either against a subjective or an objective standard, 
nevertheless must be ascertained if a contract is to be found.77 
Contracts of adhesion, however, do not conform to the norm of 
mutual assent because these contracts do not embody the “democratic 
consent of the parties.”78  Thus, in contracts of adhesion, there seems to 
be no legitimate basis for finding that the parties’ assent has been 
mutually made.  Consequently then, in contracts of adhesion, the process 
of bargaining is clearly defective because the mutuality of consent is 
missing and there is no meaningful bargain. 
Yet, one may argue that despite the adhesive nature of a pre-printed 
standard contract, an adherent may choose not to enter into the contract, 
or in other words, the adherent still has the freedom from the contract.  
But freedom from a contract does not necessarily guarantee that one 
party would be able to fairly bargain with the other party when the 
contract is entered into between the parties.  It has been pointed out that 
although parties are at liberty to refrain from entering into standardized 
transactions, the parties’ contractual power, beyond that freedom, is 
exercised primarily in specifying deviation from the standardized plan, 
rather than in defining the obligation ab initio (from the beginning).79 
Of course, the party’s assent to the contract may be evidenced by 
the signature of the party on the contract document.  But the signature, 
standing alone, does not indicate that the signing party has full 
knowledge of the contract terms.80  When a party of little bargaining 
 73. See Morris Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 558-562 (1933). 
 74. See Newman v. Shiff, 778 F.2d 460, 464 (8th Cir. 1985). 
 75. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 9, at 110. 
 76. See BLUM supra note 54, § 4.1, at 51-53. 
 77. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1185-1186. 
 78. See W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking 
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 542 (1971). 
 79. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1182. 
 80. It has been observed that for a standard contract, since it is common even for sophisticated 
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power, and hence little real choice, signs a commercially reasonable 
contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that 
he gave his consent to all of the terms, even if objectively manifested.81  
In this situation, judicial scrutiny of the fairness of the contract’s terms 
would be warranted because the adherent has nothing to do with the 
drafting of the contract and the contract is not the result of a fair 
bargain.82 
With regard to the choice of law provision in an adhesion contract, 
the adherent’s signature on the contract by no means implies that the 
adherent’s choice is meaningful.  It is true that a choice of law clause is a 
contract term.  This term, however, is different from other contract terms 
because a choice of law clause requires special knowledge or expertise 
in understanding the importance of the clause, as well as its legal 
consequences.  Therefore, an adherent faced with a choice of law clause 
in an adhesion contract is vulnerable to inherent unreasonableness and 
unfairness.  A major reason for such vulnerability is that the choice of 
law clause may subject the adherent to the laws of a jurisdiction that he 
has no familiarity with at all. 
In “wrap” agreements, the vulnerability of adherents becomes even 
more evident.  By clicking on a small icon that reads “I agree” or “I 
accept,” the adherent (user) is entering into a contract.  Sometimes, an 
adherent does not have to click on an icon, but simply downloads 
software which contains a notice saying, “by using this software, you 
agree to be bound by the terms and conditions of the software,” through 
which the adherent may be deemed to have manifested consent to the 
contract.83 
The question then is whether adherents have made a meaningful 
choice by clicking on an icon or downloading software.84  In many 
cases, the answer would be negative as to the terms and conditions of the 
contract, and in most cases, if not all, the negative answer would apply 
to the choice of law clause.  In fact, when clicking on “I agree,” 
adherents may not even be aware that they are making a choice of law 
people not to read the fine print, the contract may not represent a knowing agreement on all of its 
terms. See STEVEN BURTON, PRINCIPLE OF CONTRACT LAW 255 (West 3d. ed. 1995). 
 81. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d. 445, 449-450 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
 82. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 3, at 1077, 1082. 
 83. See Kunz, et al., Browse-Wrap Agreements, supra note 15, at 279-281. See also Mark 
Budnitz, Consumer Surfing for Sales in Cyberspace: What Constitute Acceptance and What Legal 
Terms and Conditions Bind the Consumer?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 741, 746 (2000). 
 84. See Mark Lemley, Shrinkwaps in Cyberspace, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 311, 317 (1994). 
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that will apply to the determination of the rights and obligations arising 
from the online contract. 
Those in favor of adhesion contracts from an economic viewpoint, 
however, argue that market force, under most circumstances, ensures 
that terms in form contracts are socially efficient and desirable for both 
buyers as a class and sellers as a class, and that without market failure, 
the consequentalist argument for non-enforcement of any contract terms, 
whether provided on a pre-printed form or offered on an adhesive basis, 
lacks merit.85  They further argue that the scrutiny of the form terms is 
necessary only when buyers are not fully rational, but rather make 
decisions in a boundedly rational manner, which provides seller with an 
incentive to draft non-salient contract terms to their own advantage, 
whether or not such terms are efficient.86 
Obviously and understandably, the economic theory on contracts of 
adhesion has a primary focus on market efficiency.  This theory attempts 
to analyze the validity of adhesion contracts by treating the buyers 
(adherents) as a class, and suggests that courts’ initial analytical step 
should be an analysis of whether a challenged contract term is salient to 
a significant number of buyers.87  Therefore, according to the economic 
theory, absent fraud, duress, or significant third-party externalities, no 
judicial intervention is necessary with regard to contracts of adhesion.88 
The economic theory may sound persuasive to the legitimacy of the 
existence of contracts of adhesion.  But, when the choice of law becomes 
an issue, this theory does not seem to work.  There are at least two 
reasons.  First, choice of law is not a matter of the adherents as a class, 
but rather it is an individualized choice that requires specific 
determination.  This is because the law of different jurisdictions 
involved is different and will result in different rights and obligations of 
the parties to the contract.  Second, the choice of law term is not 
something that could be ensured by the market force to be both socially 
efficient and also beneficial to non-drafting party.  Without the party’s 
knowledge, the choice of law clause would not necessarily be rational. 
The fact is that the vast use of contracts of adhesion has become 
common both in paper and electronic worlds, but the issue of mutuality 
apparently has been left out.  For example, under the Uniform 
Commercial Code (“UCC”), a contract for the sale of goods may be 
 85. See Korobkin, supra note 7, at 1207. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. 
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made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by 
both parties, which recognizes the existence of such contract.89  This 
provision is interpreted to permit contracts to be formed in other ways, 
including “wrap” agreements.90  UCITA further allows a contract to be 
formed by the interaction of electronic agents,91 meaning a computer 
program, or electronic or other automated means.92  Both the UCC and 
UCITA open the door for “wrap” agreements, and make them a valid 
form of contract.  But neither the UCC nor the UCITA address the 
parties’ mutuality of assent, based upon the fairness of the bargain, 
especially from the adherent’s standpoint, when he electronically enters 
in a contract.93 
B.  Irrational Process in Adhesion Contracts: One-Sided Autonomy 
Since contract is a private affair for which the parties have the 
liberty to express their “energetic self-interest” and to assert such 
interest, push it, and fight for it,94 it is important that the parties have the 
legal power, conferred by the law, to “make and receive enforceable 
promises, together with many of the consequences of having used that 
power.”95  Hence, in the realm of contracts, rights and duties are 
determined by the agreement of the parties.96 
It has been well stated that the main underlying purpose of the law 
of contracts is the realization of reasonable expectations that have been 
induced by the making of a promise.97  To realize the reasonable 
expectations of the parties, there must be a rational process by which the 
parties are able to fully exercise their power to make a fair and 
meaningful bargain and create the contractual rights and obligations 
between them.  In other words, the parties should have the autonomy to 
 89. U.C.C. § 2-204 (2003). 
 90. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 91. UCITA § 206 (Revised 2002). 
 92. Id. § 102(a)(27). 
 93. A relevant provision in UCITA is section 104(e), which is actually a cross reference 
pointing to the consumer protection law.  Under section 104(e), if a consumer protection law 
addresses assent, consent, or manifestation of assent, the standard of assent, consent, or 
manifestation of assent under the consumer protection law applies and, subject to Section 905, may 
be accomplished electronically.  Section 905 of UCITA deals with the federal Electronic Signature 
Global and National Commerce Act. 
 94. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 9, at 20. 
 95. See BURTON, supra note 80, at 1. 
 96. See Cohen, supra note 73, at 553. 
 97. See CORBIN, supra note 52, at 2. 
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decide what terms they include in their contract, and what terms they do 
not include in their contract.98 
The rational process, however, may not be seen in contracts of 
adhesion, where one party dominates almost everything and the other 
party barely has any realistic opportunity to make a bargain.  As noted, 
the most distinctive characteristics of an adhesion contract are that the 
contract does not result from equal bargaining and that the adherent must 
merely “adhere” to the terms tendered by the other party.99  In most 
cases, the contractual intention of a party is but a more or less voluntary 
subjection to terms dictated by the other party,100 and when one party 
drafts the contract, the undickered for terms are apt to be one-sided.101 
Because of the irrational process, in contracts of adhesion, the 
autonomy that is supposed to be equally enjoyed by both of the parties is 
twisted toward one side.  It then necessarily raises a concern about the 
disproportionate private power of one party in particular and the 
maintaining of an unjust distribution of wealth and power in general.102  
In Professor Kessler’s words: “standard contracts in particular could thus 
become effective instruments in the hands of powerful industrial and 
commercial overlords enabling them to impose new feudal order of their 
own making upon a vast host of vassals.”103 
Further, to allow the choice of law clauses that arise from one-sided 
autonomy to stand would aggravate the already unfair allocation of 
power and decrease the freedom of the parties to the contract.  On the 
one hand, by relying on contracts of adhesion, businesses not only are 
empowered to choose the contract terms most favorable to them, but also 
have the privilege to select the law they wish to govern the contracts.  
On the other hand, adherents will have no choice but to adhere to terms 
that they otherwise may not agree to, and in the meantime will have to 
be bound by the already chosen governing law of which they may have 
no knowledge at all.104 
An argument often inserted in this regard is the “duty to read” rule.  
Under this rule, a party is deemed as to have assumed the risk if he fails 
 98. See Kessler, supra note 5, at 630. 
 99. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 3, at 1082. 
 100. See Kessler, supra note 5, at 632. 
 101. See BURTON, supra note 80, at 256. 
 102. See id. at 243. 
 103. See Kessler, supra note 5, at 640. 
 104. As Prof. Mueller pointed out, “[i]n less elegant but no less accurate language, a contract 
of adhesion is a contract that sticks the helpless consumer with standard form clauses that he might 
not have agreed to if he had actually had free choice.”  See Addison Mueller, Contracts of 
Frustration, 78 YALE L. J. 576, 580 (1969). 
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to read the terms when entering into the contract.105  The underlying 
rationale is that “one who refrains from reading a contract and in 
conscious ignorance of its terms voluntarily assents thereto will not be 
relieved from his bad bargain,” and “one who signs a contract has a duty 
to read it and is obligated according to its terms.”106  It is also believed 
that the duty to read may not be an obligation, but a party may be bound 
by what he fails to read.107 
For purposes of making a contract, the duty to read serves as a 
general rule that a party who signs a contract manifests assent to the 
contract and may not later deny it by complaining about not reading or 
not understanding the contract.108  Even for standard form contracts, it is 
also held that “where a party to an agreement signs or otherwise 
manifests assent to a writing and has the reason to believe that like 
writings are regularly used to embody terms of agreements of the same 
type, he adopts the writing as an integrated agreement with respect to the 
terms included in the writing,” and “such a writing is interpreted 
wherever reasonable as treating alike all those similarly situated, without 
regard to their knowledge or understanding of the standard terms of the 
writing.”109 
However, for the “duty to read” to be valid, there are certain 
assumptions.  These assumptions mainly include: (a) there is no 
disparity of bargaining power between the parties to the contract;110 (b) 
there is a genuine opportunity to read;111 and (c) there exists a fair 
bargain as for the contract terms.112  Unfortunately, in contracts of 
adhesion, those assumptions, as is often the case, are basically missing. 
In an adhesion contract, the adherent “is usually completely or at least 
relatively unfamiliar with the form and has scant opportunity to read it – 
an opportunity often diminished by the use of fine print and convoluted 
 105. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 55, § 9.43, at 382. 
 106. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914, 916 (D.C. App. 1964). 
 107. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 55, § 9.41, n. 4, at 376. See also Rakoff, supra 
note 2, at 1185. 
 108. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 55, § 9.41, at 376. 
 109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1979). 
 110. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 55, § 9.43, at 388. 
 111. See id. § 9.45, at 391. 
 112. See Llewellyn, supra note 4, at 704 (“[W]here bargaining is absent in fact, the conditions 
and clauses to be read into a bargain are not those which happen to be printed on the unread paper, 
but are those which a sane man might reasonably expect to find on that paper.”). 
22
Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss1/1
MOZHANG_FINAL 3/23/2009  2:47 PM 
2008] CHOICE OF LAW IN CONTRACTS OF ADHESION 145 
 
clauses.”113  And frequently, fine print contracts “are designed to 
discourage a careful reading.”114 
In “wrap” agreements, users may hardly see any terms and 
conditions because most of them are hidden behind a link far below the 
icon of “I agree” or are “wrapped” in the little scroll box above the icon 
that requires a further browse-through.  Consequently, when clicking on 
the icon, a user may not even be aware of the terms to which he would 
be subject.  In this situation, some believe that “wrap” agreements are 
not really contracts at all because they are agreements over which the 
parties do not bargain and they are never expressly acknowledged by the 
parties.115  Thus, the lack of an opportunity to review the terms or 
conditions in “wrap” agreements eventually makes the traditional 
common law “duty to read” meaningless.116 
Because of the one-sided autonomy in contracts that are made on a 
“take-it-or-leave-it” basis, it is always highly questionable whether the 
parties have truly assented to be bound by the terms and conditions 
contained.  For a choice of law clause, its rationality would not exist 
without the parties’ adequate assent.  The adequacy of the assent to the 
choice of law in contracts is largely dependent on the parties’ full 
knowledge of the choice and their affirmative agreement to it.  
Unfortunately, as a general pattern, in contracts of adhesion, particularly 
“wrap” agreements, such knowledge and agreement are hardly present. 
ENFORCEABILITY OF CONTRACTS OF ADHESION: UNSETTLED ISSUE 
Today, there is a growing trend that the great majority of contracts 
are standard form contracts, especially in consumer transactions,117 and 
as noted, the dominance of adhesive contracts over negotiated contracts 
in the course of business transactions has become a common 
phenomenon.118  More strikingly, the evolution of contracts to 
accommodate electronic commerce has made “wrap” agreements the 
primary form of contract for internet transactions.119  But the law 
regulating and governing contracts of adhesion is far from settled. 
 113. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 9, § 4.26, at 286. 
 114. See BURTON, supra note 80, at 255. 
 115. See Lemley, supra note 84, at 317. 
 116. See Melissa Robertson, Is Assent Still a Prerequisite for Contract Formation in Today’s 
E-Economy? 78 WASH. L. REV. 265, 272-275 (2003). 
 117. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 431; See also Burton, supra note 80, at 255 
(stating that most contracting today is done on standard form contracts). 
 118. See Korobkin, supra note 7, at 1203. 
 119. See Kunz, et al., Browse-Wrap Agreement, supra note 15, at 279. 
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The major issue is whether adhesive contracts are enforceable.  
Since contracts of adhesion have departed from the traditional notions of 
fair bargaining and mutuality of assent that are the essence of 
contracts,120 the enforceability of contracts of adhesion inevitably 
becomes the center of discussion.  One view is that the contacts of 
adhesion, like negotiated contracts, are prima facie enforceable.121  
Therefore, absent fraud, duress or significant third-party externalities, no 
judicial intervention is necessary.122  Under this view, not all contracts 
of adhesion should be per se invalid.123  Rather these contracts should be 
enforceable unless the contract in question results in unfairness.124 
Others argue that the terms in contracts of adhesion are 
presumptively unenforceable.125  It can be argued that because the 
parties lack actual contractual consent, contracts of adhesion are 
illegitimate by their very nature.126  Another argument is that the 
enforceability of contracts of adhesion involves allocation of power and 
freedom between businesses and individuals,127 and to enforce contracts 
of adhesion encroaches on the freedom of adherents because the 
adhesive terms are imposed on the transaction in a way no individual 
adherent can prevent.128  In addition, it is suggested that courts should 
not enforce “wrap” agreements against adherents because the 
enforcement offends traditional principles of contract law.129 
What is uncertain then is whether ordinary contract law applies to 
contracts of adhesion as well.130  It has been observed that the common 
law of standardized contracts is highly chaotic because courts have been 
making efforts to protect the weaker contracting party, while apparently 
still trying to keep “the elementary rules” of the law of contracts 
intact.131  This legal uncertainty today appears to become more eminent 
in the transactions that take place online.132  Thus, there is an increasing 
 120. See Robertson, supra note 116, at 296 (arguing that browse-wrap agreements stray too far 
from the basic contractual principles of notice and assent). 
 121. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1176. 
 122. See Korobkin, supra note 7, at 1207. 
 123. See Goodman, supra note 13, at 327. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1176. 
 126. See Randy Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 645 (2002). 
 127. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1174. 
 128. See id. at 1237. 
 129. See Robertson, supra note 116, at 296. 
 130. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1284. See also Korobkin, supra note 7, at 1207. 
 131. See Kessler, supra note 5, at 633. 
 132. See Hillman and Rachlinski, supra note 6, at pp 430-432 (asserting that “lawmakers and 
theorists currently are debating the need for a new set of rules to support” the transactions on the 
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call for development of a new legal structure because contracts of 
adhesion are deemed to represent a different social practice from 
“ordinary” contract.133 
In order to help cope with the Internet-based contracts of adhesions, 
namely “wrap” agreements, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) 
organized a working group in 1988 to conduct a two-part project on the 
validity of the assent process in electronic form agreements: one part 
focuses on click-through agreements and the other part on browse- 
through agreements.  As a result, the working group produced a laundry 
list of suggestions to help in determining whether the parties to a 
contract validly and reliably assent to the terms of a browse-wrap 
agreement, and introduced a set of strategies for avoiding disputes on the 
validity of the mutual assent process.134  Apparently, both the laundry 
list and the set of strategies were based on existing rules of law from 
cases and commentary.  This group attempted to apply the “paper world” 
principles to the electronic contract setting.135 
Courts vary in handling the validity issue of adhesion contracts, and 
the judicial distinction between enforceable and unenforceable contracts 
of adhesion is obscure and often confusing.136  Struggling to seek the 
balance between the protection of consumers from being exploited by 
businesses and the promotion of market efficiency,137 courts on the one 
hand recognize that standard terms don’t have the “bargain” required in 
an ordinary contract.  On the other hand, the courts attempt to recognize 
Internet, and believing that although e-commerce changes some of the dynamics of standard-form 
contracting in interesting and novel ways and presents some new challenges, these differences do 
not call for the development of a radically different legal regime); See Budnitz, supra note 83, at 
741-742 (arguing that the current contract rules are inadequate because they fail to address many 
issues that arise in Web-based consumer sales). 
 133. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1283-1284. 
 134. The list includes: (i) The user is provided with adequate notice of the existence of the 
proposed terms; (ii) The user has a meaningful opportunity to review the terms; (iii) The user is 
provided with adequate notice that taking a specified action manifests assent to the terms; and (iv) 
The user takes the action specified in the latter notice.  See Kunz et al., Browse-Wrap Agreements, 
supra note 15, at 281.  There are fifteen strategies divided into six groups: opportunity to review 
terms, display of terms, rejection of terms and its consequences, assent to terms, opportunity to 
correct errors, and keeping record to prove asset.  See Kunz et al, Click-Through Agreements, supra 
note 14, at 402. 
 135. See Kunz et al., Browse-Wrap Agreements, supra note 15, at 281. 
 136. For the doctrine governing contract enforcement in general, it has long been criticized as 
vague, ill-defined, and easily muddled.  See Hillman and Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 434. 
 137. See id. at 440 (“The ability of businesses to identify efficient allocation of risks also gives 
them the opportunity to exploit consumers by getting them to accept contract terms that inefficiently 
shift risks to consumers. . . .and a dilemma facing courts is that failing to enforce a standard term 
against consumers could undermine an efficient allocation of contractual risks.”). 
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that market forces could ensure that a mutually beneficial exchange is 
included in standard terms of the contract.138  Indeed, in many cases 
courts have found it difficult to accommodate both concerns.139  Also the 
objective and subjective theories of contract formation, to the extent that 
the parties’ assent is ascertained, significantly complicate the process of 
determining the validity of contracts.140 
In today’s “paper world,” there seems to be a general assumption 
that contracts of adhesion are enforceable.141  Hence, it is said that courts 
have the tendency not to strike down terms of an adhesion contract, 
unless they believe businesses have gone too far.142  But, how far is too 
far?  A very common test used by courts to determine whether an 
adhesion contract should be enforced is the so-called 
“unconscionability” doctrine.  This test now appears to have become the 
general principle that a court will not enforce a standard form contract if 
the contract is found unconscionable.143 
With regard to “wrap” agreements, however, courts split widely.  
The assumption of validity does not seem to be as readily accepted by 
courts as it is normally accepted in the traditional “paper world.”144  
 138. See id. at 454-55. 
 139. See BURTON, supra note 80, at 256. 
 140. Whether assent should be determined on the basis of the parties actual or apparent 
intentions invoked one of the most significant doctrinal struggles in the development of contract 
law, that between the subjective and objective theories.  See FARNSWORTH, supra note 9, § 3.6, at 
114-117. 
 141. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1191. 
 142. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 455. 
 143. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 55, § 9.39, at 372 (pointing out that in most of the 
cases in which unconscionability has been found, non-enforcement of a clause has been the result). 
 144. In federal courts for example, in some cases, courts have held the wrap agreements 
enforceable.  Person v. Google Inc., 456 F. Supp.2d 488, 495-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (upholding forum 
selection clause in Google’s AdWords users agreement); Novak v. Overture Servs., 309 F. Supp. 2d 
446, 458-59 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (upholding click-through terms and conditions agreement); Mortgage 
Plus, Inc. v. Docmagic, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20145, at *26-27 (D. Kan, 2004) (holding 
enforceable click-wrap license and forum selection clause within the license); Davidson & Assoc., 
Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1177  (E.D. Mo. 2004) (upholding two click-wrap 
user agreements); Freedman v. America Online, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 2d 238, 242 (D. Conn. 2003) 
(upholding AOL’s forum selection clause); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 
255 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (enforcing a term within a browse-wrap agreement).  In some other cases, 
courts have refused to enforce wrap agreements on the ground that the wrap agreements do not 
require users to affirmatively assent to the terms and conditions, and without assent no valid 
contract exists. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1190 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (holding 
cellphone arbitration clause unconscionable); Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (N. 
D. Cal. 2002) (rejecting a motion to compel arbitration because the user agreement was 
unconscionable); Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (placing the enforceability of browse-wrap agreements into question); Klocek v. Gateway, 
Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339-40 (D. Kan, 2000) (rejecting enforceability of shrink-wraps). 
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Courts are more concerned about whether the parties are able to 
adequately manifest their assent.145  One reason is that the wrap 
agreements do not fit well within the bargain theory of conventional 
contract formation and, therefore, require fact-specific rulings highly 
dependent on the contract circumstances.146  The other reason is that 
given the different environment of new dynamics of e-commerce in 
which most wrap agreements operate, it is often difficult to determine 
what conduct of the parties qualifies as a clear manifestation of assent.147  
Also, there is a doubt that current law is sufficient to guarantee the 
enforcement of wrap agreements.148  As a consequence, there is lack of 
uniform consensus regarding enforceability of wrap agreements.149 
It is important to note that the terms most commonly providing the 
impetus to challenge the enforceability of electronic standard form 
agreements are dispute resolution clauses.150  The dispute resolution 
clauses in a contract are the clauses by which the contractual parties are 
to dispose of the disputes arising out of the contract in the way they 
agreed.151  In commercial transactions, the dispute resolution clauses 
normally refer to three clauses: (a) arbitration clause providing for 
resolution of disputes through arbitration, (b) choice of forum clause 
designating a jurisdiction to which the disputes, if they arise, are to be 
submitted for adjudication, and (c) choice of law clause selecting an 
applicable law by which the contract in question will be governed.152 
It has been observed that the dispute resolution clauses are the most 
significant terms of the contract, possibly determinative of the entire 
 145. See Robertson, supra note 116, at 287. 
 146. See Zachary Harrison, Just Click Here: Article 2B’s Failure to Guarantee Adequate 
Manifestation of Assent in Click-Wrap Contracts, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 
908, 914 (1998). 
 147. See Budnitz, supra note 83, at 759. 
 148. See Bern, supra note 20, at 641, 649. 
 149. See Robertson, supra note 116, at 287 (suggesting that a uniform consensus regarding to 
the enforceability of browse-wrap agreement is needed). 
 150. See Kunz, et al., Browse-Wrap Agreements, supra note 15, at 280-281. 
 151. See Michael Gruson, Governing Law Clauses in Commercial Agreements – New York’s 
Approach, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 323, 323 (1979) (“The parties to a commercial agreement 
have an understandable desire that the rights and obligations under the agreement be as well defined 
and predictable as possible.”). 
 152. The choice of forum and choice of law may be contained in a single contract clause, and 
may also be provided separately.  In Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court, for example, the dispute 
settlement clause in question read: “This agreement shall be governed and construed in accordance 
with Hong Kong law and each party hereby irrevocably submits to the exclusive jurisdiction and 
service of process of the Hong Kong courts.”  834 P. 2d 1148, 1149 (Cal. S. Ct. 1992). 
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outcome of the negotiations.153  In freely negotiated contracts, these 
clauses are the result of extensive bargaining.  In contracts of adhesion, 
however, the dispute resolution clauses frequently become the means by 
which businesses maintain legal certainty and predictability to their own 
advantage.  For example, the forum selection clause, which commonly 
appears in “wrap” agreements, is employed by the licenser to bring 
certainty to internet-based transactions that lack any fixed geographic 
location.154 
In cases where courts address the enforceability of dispute 
resolution clauses in contracts of adhesion, one major issue is whether 
adherents have adequately manifested assent to the clauses.  Quite often, 
in “wrap” agreements, the dispute resolution clauses are either unread by 
the users or the users are unaware of these clauses.  Thus, to find 
adequate manifestation of assent in this regard, courts have to interpret 
what constitutes the required assent sufficient to render the dispute 
resolution clauses enforceable.  With respect to “wrap” agreements, a 
common question is what clicking on “I agree” is supposed to mean.155  
In addition, enforceability largely depends on whether courts find these 
clauses to be fair and reasonable. 
Unfortunately, although the reoccurrence of the issue of 
enforceability of dispute resolution clauses in adhesion contracts in both 
“paper” and “electronic” worlds is becoming more frequent, no 
consensus has yet developed as to the proper mechanism to deal with 
this issue.156  In respect to adhesive choice of law, there is scarcely any 
established precedent or rule that has directly addressed it.157  Most of 
 153. See GEORGES DELAUME, LAW AND PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS 173 
(Oceana 1988). 
 154. See Harrison, supra note 146, at 911. 
 155. See Barnett, supra note 126, at 637-638. 
 156. See Person v. Google Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 157. Courts often viewed the choice of law in light of reasonableness to apply the law so 
chosen rather than the parties’ true assent to the choice.  For instance, in Falbe v. Dell, Inc., No. 04-
C-1425, 2004 WL 1588243 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2004), Falbe ordered a computer over the telephone 
from Dell.  When that computer arrived the packaging contained the "Terms and Conditions" of the 
sale, including a choice-of-law provision by which the Texas law was selected as governing law.  
Plaintiff, an Illinois resident who had purchased a computer from the defendant via telephone, 
disagreed and argued that Illinois law controlled.  The U.S. District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois did not examine the issue of Plaintiff’s consent to the choice, but instead, the court looked 
at whether the choice of law provision contravened Illinois public policy and whether the state 
chosen bore any reasonable relationship to the parties or the transaction.  Another example is 
Discover Bank v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), where plaintiff, a 
credit card holder, brought a class action against Discover Bank, credit card issuer, for, among 
others, breach of contract.  The contract between Plaintiff and Discover Bank had a Delaware 
choice-of-law agreement, and Discover Bank argued that under the agreement, Delaware law would 
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the cases where the dispute resolution in contracts of adhesion was at 
issue basically involved the choice of forum clause or arbitration clause. 
A. Doctrine of Unconscionability and its Application 
As noted, a popular doctrine that courts in the United States have 
been using to examine the enforceability of adhesive dispute settlement 
clauses or contracts of adhesion in general is the doctrine of 
unconscionability.  Originally the doctrine of unconscionability was an 
equitable remedy in contract cases158 and available mostly to refuse 
specific performance.159  The unconscionability doctrine became a 
general rule applicable to all contracts for sale of goods in 1940s when it 
was adopted in section 2-302 of the U.C.C.160  Later, this rule was 
extended to apply to all contracts through section 208 of Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts (1981).161 
apply.  Although the Supreme Court of California did not address the choice of law issue and chose 
to remand the case on the determination of choice of law, it did offer certain comments as guidance 
for the lower court on remand.  In its comments, the Supreme Court of California opined to have 
enforceability of the choice of law clause evaluated under the analytical approach of §187 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.  According to the Supreme Court of California, the court 
must first determine (1) whether the chosen state has a substantial relationship to the parties or their 
transaction, or (2) whether there is any other reasonable basis for the parties’ choice of law.  If 
neither of these tests is met, there is the end of inquiry, and the court need not enforce the parties’ 
choice of law.  If however, either test is met, the court must next determine whether the chosen 
state’s law is contrary to a fundamental policy of California.  If there is no such conflict, the court 
shall enforce the parties’ choice of law.  If however, there is a fundamental conflict with California 
law, the court must then determine whether California has a “materially greater interest than the 
chosen state in the determination of the particular issue.  If California has a materially greater 
interest then the chosen state, the choice of law shall not be enforced . . . .”  Id. at 173- 74.  Once 
again, the Court did not make any inquiry about Plaintiff’s adequate assent to the choice of law 
clause in the fine-printed agreement provided by the defendant. 
 158. See BLUM supra note 54, § 13.11.2, at 382. 
 159. See AMY KASTELY, ET. AL., CONTRACTING LAW, 609 (Carolina Academic Press 2d. ed. 
2000). 
 160. Section 2-302 of the U.C.C. provides as follows (in 2003 amendment, the word “clause” 
was changed to “term”): 
§ 2-302. Unconscionable Contract or Clause 
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have 
been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the 
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable 
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any 
unconscionable result. 
If it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may be 
unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence 
as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the 
determination. 
U.C.C. § 2-302 (1998). 
 161. Section 208 of Restatement (Second) of Contracts Provides: 
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But neither section 2-302 of the U.C.C. nor section 208 of the 
Restatement is clear about what constitutes unconscionability, although 
both of them are intended to empower the courts to refuse a contract if 
the contract is found unconscionable, or to adjust the contract by 
removing or modifying the unconscionable provision in the contract.162  
According to the official comments to section 2-302 of the UCC, “the 
basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial background 
and commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the term or contract 
involved is so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the 
circumstances existing at the time of the making of contract.”163 
The leading case in which the unconscionability doctrine was 
illustrated and applied is Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.164  
This case involves a series of purchases of household items under a 
standard form contract.  Mrs. Williams, the purchaser, a single mother of 
seven children subsisting on public assistance with limited education, 
entered into an installment payment plan with Walker-Thomas 
purchasing several household items from it over the course of a five year 
period from 1957 through 1965.  The terms of each purchase were 
provided in a printed form contract.  In the contract, there was a “cross 
collateralization” clause that had the effect of keeping a balance due on 
every item purchased until the balance due on all items, whenever 
purchased, was liquidated.165  As a result, the debt incurred at the time of 
the purchase of each item was secured by the right to repossess all the 
items previously purchased by the same purchaser, and each new item 
purchased automatically became subject to a security interest arising out 
of previous dealings.166 
With an outstanding balance of One Hundred and Sixty-Four 
Dollars ($164) Mrs. Williams purchased a stereo set that cost Five 
Hundred and Fourteen Dollars and Ninety-Five Cents ($514.95).  Mrs. 
Williams defaulted on her monthly payments because of her inability to 
pay.  Walker-Thomas filed a compliant seeking replevin of all the items 
purchased from the very beginning.  The Court of General Sessions 
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court 
may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without 
the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as 
to avoid any unconscionable result. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981). 
 162. See BLUM, supra note 54, § 13.11.3, at 383. 
 163. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977) cmt. 
 164. 350 F.2d 445 (1965). 
 165. See id. at 447. 
 166. See id. 
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entered a judgment for Walker-Thomas and the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals affirmed.  On appeal to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia, the case was remanded for a 
determination of unconscionability.167 
In this case, Judge Wright’s majority opinion on the doctrine of 
unconscionability is influential.  His opinion sets forth a two-pronged 
test of unconscionability.  Under the test, unconscionability is to be 
determined by examining (1) whether there is an absence of meaningful 
choice on the part of the parties, and (2) whether the contract terms are 
unreasonably favorable to the other party.168 
Since Williams, many courts have recognized this two-pronged 
test169 and further developed it into a test that divides unconscionability 
into the categories of “procedural” and “substantive.”  Procedural 
unconscionability focuses on the formation process of contract to 
determine if in fact one party lacked any meaningful choice in entering 
into the contract.170  Substantive unconscionability examines the 
contents or substances of the contract to determine whether the terms are 
unreasonably one-sided.171 
As a general matter, unconscionability requires a showing that a 
contract is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable when 
made.172  In determining whether a contract is unconscionable, courts 
often employ a sliding scale analysis with regard to the presence of the 
procedural and substantive components of unconscionability – that is, 
the more significant one is, the less significant the other need be.173  In 
other words, if more of one is present, then less of the other is 
required.174  Normally, a court will find a contract is unconscionable 
when the contract involves a combination of procedural and substantive 
defects.  Either procedure or substantive unconscionability alone is not 
enough.175 
The doctrine of unconscionability, however, has been attacked as “a 
term that has been defined only imprecisely, at best, and often not at 
 167. See id. at 450. 
 168. See id. at 449-450. 
 169. See FERRIELL & NAVIN, UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS 543 (LexisNexis 2004). 
 170. Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Services VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 276-77 (3d. Cir. 2004). 
 171. Brower v. Gateway 2000, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). 
 172. For more discussion about procedural and substantive unconscionability, see Arthur Leff, 
Unconsionability and the Code – the Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967). 
 173. Blake v. Ecker, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 422, 433 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
 174. See BLUM supra note 54, § 13.11.3, at 383 (Aspen 2004). 
 175. See id. 
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all.”176  In fact, the issue of unconscionability is viewed and handled in 
courts through a factor-oriented analysis on a case-by-case basis.177  A 
general holding is that a claim of unconscionability cannot be 
determined merely by examining the face of the contract, but will 
require an inquiry into its commercial setting, purpose, and effect, 
including the circumstances in which the contract was executed.178 
Consequently, when making a determination of unconscionability, 
courts often rule differently and do not seem willing to establish any 
bright line.179  For example, in some cases, contracts of adhesion are 
regarded as procedurally unconscionable,180 while in other cases, it is 
held that a finding of procedural unconscionability may not be based 
solely on the adhesive nature of the contract.181  Another example is the 
rule of duty to read.  Although there is a tendency to treat the duty to 
read in contracts of adhesion differently from that in other contracts, 
there is no consistency in the legal authorities and, at times, there are 
different results in cases where the fact patterns are substantially 
similar.182 
As for adhesive dispute resolution clauses specifically, the doctrine 
of unconscionability is being applied in the same way as it applied to 
regular contracts.  But once again, the decisions are almost always made 
on an ad hoc basis and are at variance with each other.  In Comb v. 
Paypal,183 for example, plaintiffs who had funds removed from the bank 
by defendant, an electronic disbursement service supplier, sued 
defendant for violation of federal and state laws, seeking injunctive 
relief and related remedies on behalf of a purported nationwide class.  
Defendant moved to compel individual arbitration pursuant to the 
arbitration clause contained in the standard user agreement.  In denying 
defendant’s motion, the United State District Court for Northern District 
 176. See ROBERT SCOTT AND JODY KRAUS, CONTRACT AND THEORY 554 (LexisNexis 3d. ed. 
2002). 
 177. In re Marriage of Gene M. Gudmundson and Geng Hui Gudmundson, 955 P.2d 648, 653 
(Mt. 1998) (“Unconscionability is to be determined by the district court on a case-by-case basis.”). 
 178. Blake, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 433; See also Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd. 
23 N.Y. 2d 398, 403 (N.Y. 1968) (whether a contract or any clause of the contract is unconscionable 
is a matter for the court to decide against the background of the contract’s commercial setting, 
purpose and effect). 
 179. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 55, § 9.40, at 373. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See id.; Ting v. AT & T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 927-28 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 182. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 55, § 9.45, at 391. 
 183. Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
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of California held that the arbitration clause was both procedurally and 
substantively unconscionable.184 
On the procedural prong inquiry, the district court made it clear that 
a contract or clause is procedurally unconscionable if it is a contract of 
adhesion.185  According to the court, a contract of adhesion is “a 
standard contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior 
bargaining strength, regulates to the subscribing party only the 
opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it,” and the user agreement 
and the arbitration clause at issue in this case met this definition.186 
With respect to the substantive prong, the district court found the 
arbitration clause unconscionable on the following grounds: (a) it lacked 
mutuality of remedies because defendant alone possessed the right to 
make final decisions concerning a dispute; (b) it prohibited plaintiffs 
from consolidating their claims; (c) it could induce prohibitive 
arbitration fees; and (d) it limited the venue to the defendant’s backyard 
by requiring any arbitration to take place in Santa Clara County, 
California.  The final factor appears to be yet another way by which the 
arbitration clause serves to shield defendant from liability instead of 
providing a neutral forum.187 
The Hubbert v. Dell Corp. case,188 however, went in a different 
direction.  In that case, several purchasers of Dell computers filed a class 
action claim against Dell in Illinois.  The purchases were made online 
through Dell’s website.  The “Terms and Conditions of Sale,” which 
included an arbitration clause, were accessible by clicking on a blue 
hyperlink on each of the five web pages.  Based on the arbitration 
clause, Dell moved to dismiss the action, or to compel arbitration.  The 
Circuit Court, Madison County, denied Dell’s motion.  On appeal, the 
Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District, reversed. 
The appellate court held that a contract of adhesion is not 
automatically unconscionable.  Therefore, merely including an 
arbitration clause in a contract of adhesion was insufficient to hold that 
the arbitration clause was procedurally unconscionable.189  It was further 
held that the arbitration clause was not substantially unconscionable if 
there was no specific evidence that excessive fees and costs would 
actually be charged to effectively deny plaintiffs access to arbitration.  
 184. See id. at 1177. 
 185. See id. at 1172. 
 186. See id. 
 187. See id. at 1173-77. 
 188. Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
 189. See id. at 124. 
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Moreover, plaintiffs’ argument that they were being deprived of a 
remedy because they were forced to arbitrate was insufficient to sustain 
the burden of proving that the arbitration clause was unconscionable.190 
B. The “Carnival” Ruling and Fairness Standard 
In 1991, the Supreme Court, in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. 
Shute,191 made an unusual foray into contract law192 by addressing the 
issue of the validity of choice of forum clauses in contracts of adhesion.  
While expanding significantly the permissible use of contractual forum-
selection clauses,193 the Supreme Court did not base its analysis on the 
“unconscionability” doctrine, but rather the Court focused on the 
evaluation of “fundamental fairness,” a standard that the Court 
established in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,194 a 1972 case in 
which the Court upheld a contractual choice of forum clause contained 
in a freely negotiated contract selecting a British court as the forum 
before which “any dispute arising must be treated.”195 
In the Carnival case, the Shutes, residents of Washington State, 
purchased, through an agent, a seven day cruise aboard Carnival’s ship.  
Carnival, a Florida based Panamanian corporation, sent a “contract 
ticket” to the Shutes in the State of Washington.  On the back of the fine 
print ticket, there was a forum selection clause in paragraph eight of the 
25 total small printed paragraphs.  The forum selection clause stated that 
all disputes arising out of or related to the contract would be litigated in 
Florida.196 
During the cruise, Mrs. Shute was injured when she slipped on the 
wet deck during a guided tour of the ship’s gallery.  The Shutes sued 
Carnival in a federal district court in the State of Washington.  The 
 190. See id. at 125-126. 
 191. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), superceded by statute, 46 
U.S.C. App. § 183(c), as recognized in Yang v. M/V Minas Yeo, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 2235, at 
*4 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that the statute “discounts forum-selection clauses only in the passenger 
context”). 
 192. See FERRIEL & NAVIN, supra note 169, at 548. 
 193. See William Richman, Carnival Cruise Lines: Forum Selection Clauses in Adhesion 
Contracts, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 977 (1992). 
 194. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), superceded by statute, 28 U.S.C. 
1404(a), as recognized in Outokumpu Eng'g Enters. v. Kvaerner Enviropower, 685 A.2d 724 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1996). 
 195. See id. at 2. 
 196. On the ticket, Paragraph 8 provided that “all disputes and matters whatsoever arising 
under, in connection with or incident to this Contract shall be litigated, if at all, in and before a 
Court located in the State of Florida, U.S.A. to the exclusion of the Courts of any other state or 
country.”  Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 587-588. 
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district court dismissed claim on the ground of forum selection clause.  
The court of appeals reversed holding the forum selection clause invalid 
because it was not freely bargained for.  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and reversed.197 
The main tenet of the Supreme Court’s Carnival ruling is its 
rejection of the view that adhesive forum selection clauses are invalid 
per se.198  In an attempt to extend Bremen to cover adhesion contracts,199 
the Supreme Court refined its analysis of Bremen to account for the 
realities of form passage contracts by emphasizing that a non-negotiated 
forum selection clause in a form contract is subject to judicial scrutiny 
for fundamental fairness, but not necessarily unenforceable simply 
because it is not the subject of bargaining.200 
In finding fundamental fairness, the Supreme Court centered its 
analysis on an evaluation of reasonableness.  In holding the non-
negotiated forum selection clause in question reasonable, the Court 
reasoned that: (1) a cruise line has a special interest in limiting the fora 
in which it potentially could be subject to suit; (2) the clause has the 
effect of reducing uncertainty and saving the parties and the courts time 
and expenses in ascertaining proper forum; and (3) the clause helps 
reduce fares, which reflect the savings that the cruise line enjoys by 
limiting the fora in which it may be sued.201  In addition, the Court 
observed that there was neither a bad faith motive to use the forum 
selection clause as a means of discouraging cruise passengers from 
pursuing legitimate claims, nor was there any fraud or overreaching.202 
A significant impact of the Supreme Court’s Carnival ruling is that 
it opened the door widely to hold the “non-freely-bargained for” 
contracts prima facie valid and signaled that the adhesive nature of a 
contract is no longer a defense to enforcement of a forum selection 
agreement.203  But the ruling is flawed in several aspects.  First, it 
reversed the common law rule of subjecting terms in contracts of 
adhesion to scrutiny for reasonableness, but provided no sound basis for 
generalizing the validation of the adhesive choice of forum clauses.  As 
 197. See id. at 596. 
 198. See Richman, supra note 193, at 981. 
 199. In Bremen, the Supreme Court held that forum selection clauses are prima facie valid and 
should be enforced unless the enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or the clauses were 
invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching.  Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10. 
 200. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 593, 595. 
 201. See id. at 593-94. 
 202. See id. at 595. 
 203. See Patrick Borchers, Forum Selection Agreement in the Federal Courts After Carnival 
Cruise: A Proposal for Congressional Reform, 67 WASH. L. REV. 55, 90 (1992). 
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Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion pointed out, the reduction of 
litigation costs does not suffice to render the choice of forum in the fine 
print on the back of ticket reasonable.204 
Second, the Carnival ruling blurred the fundamental fairness 
standard set forth in Bremen.  Under the Bremen rule, the lack of 
negotiation and the existence of unbalanced bargaining power is the 
basis for invalidating a forum selection clause.205  By rejecting that 
basis, the Carnival ruling actually implies that it validates nearly all 
conceivable choice of forum clauses, no matter how unfair or 
adhesive.206  As a result, the Supreme Court’s sharp turn and convoluted 
doctrine in Carnival leaves lower courts now in disarray.207 
Third, the validity per se rule, as applied to choice of forum clauses 
of an adhesive nature, imposes unreasonable, and often unfair, burdens 
on adherents.  Under the Carnival ruling, a forum selection clause can 
bind the parties even where the agreement in question is a form 
consumer contract not subject to negotiation, and the party resisting the 
clause must overcome a substantial presumption in favor of 
enforcement.208  This scenario, as a matter of fact, places consumers, 
already weak parties, in a much weaker position.  The resulting disparity 
in the advantages between consumers and businesses has ultimately 
presented a need to call for congressional reform in order to strike a fair 
balance and to help eliminate various sources of confusion and traps for 
the unwary.209 
Nevertheless, Carnival establishes a precedent governing the 
determination of enforceability of adhesive choice of forum clauses.  But 
the question is whether the Carnival rule would also apply to the 
enforceability of choice of law clauses in adhesion contracts.  In 
Milanovich v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A,210 the D.C. Circuit Court upheld a 
choice of law provision contained in a passenger ticket for a one-week 
Caribbean cruise on an Italian flag vessel owned by the defendant. 
Under the provision, Italian law was selected as the “ruling law of the 
 204. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 597-598 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
 205. See Borchers, supra note 203, at 90; See also Person v. Google Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 488 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that forum selection clause must be mandatory to be enforced). See also 
Novak v. Overture Services, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 446 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that forum 
selection clauses contained in Internet provider’s user agreement are regularly enforced). 
 206. See Borchers, supra note 204, at 106. 
 207. See id. at 59. 
 208. Freedman v. America Online, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 2d 238 (2003). 
 209. See Borchers, supra note 203, at 106. 
 210. Milanovich v. Costa Crociere, S.p.A., 954 F. 2d 763, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
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contract.”211  In reaching its decision, the Court held that under Bremen 
and Carnival, courts should honor a contractual choice of law provision 
in a passenger ticket unless the party challenging the enforcement of the 
provision can establish that enforcement would be “unreasonable and 
unjust.”212 
Some then suggest that Carnival was the case where the Supreme 
Court held that the choice of law clause in contracts of adhesion should 
be enforced.213  This suggestion seems to be misleading.  First, in 
Carnival, the Supreme Court limited its discussion to the forum-
selection clause contained in tickets and did not involve the choice of 
law issue.214  Second, although choice of law and choice of forum are 
the problems arising from the overlap, or conflict, among laws or 
policies of different states or countries,215 they are different in that the 
former deals with the selection of law designed to provide substantive 
rules of decision,216 and the latter involves the right of particular court to 
adjudicate the case.217 
Even in Milanovich, when applying Carnival, the D.C. Circuit 
Court cautiously pointed out that a preliminary question existed as to 
whether the choice of law clause was validly incorporated into the 
passage ticket.218  According to the Court, the answer to the preliminary 
question depended on whether the clause had been “reasonably 
communicated” to the passenger.219  Thus, the Carnival ruling that 
addresses the enforceability of forum selection clauses, without more, 
may not imply that the same ruling will equally apply to the 
determination of the fate of the choice of law clauses. 
 211. See id. at 765. 
 212. See id. at 768. 
 213. See David Johnson, Susan Crawford, and Samir Jain, Deferring to Contract Choices of 
Law and Forum to Protect Consumers (and Vendors) in E-Commerce, (working draft, 1999), 
Chicago-Kent College of Law Internet Jurisprudence, available at 
http://www.kentlaw.edu/cyberlaw/docs/draft/crawford.himl. 
 214. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 587 (1991), superceded by statute, 46 
U.S.C. App. § 183(c), as recognized in Yang v. M/V Minas Yeo, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 2235, at 
*4 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that the statute “discounts forum-selection clauses only in the passenger 
context”). 
 215. See DAVID P. CURRIE, HERMA HILL KAY & LARRY KRAMER, CONFLICT OF LAWS, CASES-
COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 366 (6th ed. 2001). 
 216. See id. 
 217. See LEA BRILMAYER & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, CONFLICT OF LAWS, CASES & MATERIALS 
445 (5th ed. 2002). 
 218. Milanovich v. Costa Crociere, S.p.A., 954 F. 2d 763, 768 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 219. See id. 
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C. The “ProCD” Decision and “Money Now, Terms Later” Approach 
A highly controversial case concerning enforcement of contracts of 
adhesion is ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,220 where the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the terms of a shrink-wrap 
agreement.  The main thrust of the ProCD decision is its endorsement of 
a “money now, terms later” approach under which an adherent could be 
held to have agreed to the adhesive terms not available to him prior to or 
at the time of the purchase.221 
In ProCD, the plaintiff, ProCD, Inc., spent millions of dollars 
creating a CD Rom telephone database that contains more than 3,000 
telephone directories.  The plaintiff, through vendors, sold the database 
called “Select Phone” to two groups of buyers: the general public for 
personal use at a low price (consumer package) and businesses at a 
higher price (business package).  Defendant bought a consumer package 
from a retail store and resold the information in the Select Phone 
database online.222 
Within the package box, there was a Single User License 
Agreement (“the Agreement”) that was wrapped in transparent plastic so 
that the buyer would be able to read the license only after he purchased 
the item.223  The Agreement was mentioned outside of the box in “small 
print,” but did not “detail the specific terms of the license.”224  Inside the 
box, the Agreement stated: 
By using the discs and the listings licensed to you, you agreed to be 
bound by the terms of this License.  If you do not agree to the terms of 
this License, promptly return all copies of the software, listings that 
you have been exported, the discs and the User Guide to the place 
where you obtained it.225 
The Agreement prohibited the user from making the listings available in 
whole or in part to any other user.226  The user then may only be able to 
see the agreement on the screen when the program was first installed and 
the “click” by the user on the “agree” button was required before 
proceeding. 
 220. See ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 221. See Bern, supra note 20, at 650. 
 222. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449-1450. 
 223. See ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 644 (W.D. Wis. 1996), rev’d, 86 F.3d 1447 
(7th Cir. 1996). 
 224. See id. at 654. 
 225. See id. at 644. 
 226. See id. at 645. 
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Based on the Agreement, ProCD filed a civil action for injunctive 
and monetary relief.  Defendant moved for summary judgment.  In 
granting defendant’s motion, the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Wisconsin held that defendant was not bound by the 
“shrink-wrap” license included in the software because defendant never 
assented to it.227  The Seventh Circuit reversed.  With regard to the issue 
of whether buyers of computer software must obey the terms of shrink-
wrap licenses, the court opined that shrink-wrap licenses are enforceable 
unless their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in 
general.228 
The defendant’s major argument in ProCD was that the terms of 
the license agreement were not part of the purchase contract because 
they were not presented to him at the time of purchase.229  The Seventh 
Circuit Court rejected this defense for the reason that transactions in 
which the exchange of money precedes the communication of detailed 
terms are common.230  Thus, the court concluded that no contract had 
been formed until the defendant inspected the package, tried out the 
software, learned of the license and did not reject the goods.231 
The Seventh Circuit Court in ProCD reversed the prior shrink-wrap 
jurisprudence in federal courts, which holds that the terms were not part 
of the bargained for exchange since consumers could only review the 
terms after making the purchase,232 and laid a foundation for 
enforcement of these terms.233  But, ProCD’s upholding of post-
purchase terms, though seemingly innovative, is problematic. 
First, ProCD confused the issue as to at what point the wrap terms 
would become part of the contract.234  By permitting a contract to be 
formed at a time after the purchase is made, the Court indicates that in 
shrink-wrap agreements, an offeror (vendor) may invite acceptance by 
additional conduct after the purchase and propose limitation on the kind 
of conduct that constitutes acceptance.235  From the offeree’s 
(consumer’s) perspective, terms that were not accessible to them at the 
time of purchase, because they were contained in the wraps, may 
 227. See id. at 644. 
 228. The grounds given by the Court as an example included violation of a rule of positive law 
and being unconscionable. See ProCD, 86 F.3d. at 1449. 
 229. See ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 654. 
 230. See ProCD, 86 F.3d. at 1451. 
 231. See id. at 1453. 
 232. See Goodman, supra note 13, at 337, 344. 
 233. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 487. 
 234. See Harrison, supra note 146, at 926. 
 235. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452. 
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become part of the contract when certain conduct amounting to 
acceptance takes place at a later time.236 
Second, the rationale underlying ProCD rests on an assumption that 
the wrap terms are enforceable per se even if they are not the fruit of free 
bargain because “notice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right 
to return the product for a refund if the terms are not acceptable” are “a 
means of doing business valuable to buyers and sellers alike.”237  This 
methodology seems to suggest that the consumer’s right to return is 
determinative no matter how bizarre the inside terms are and how 
unconscionable the formation of the contract is. 
Also, ProCD treated shrink-wrap agreements the same as regular 
contracts, thus ignoring the difference between contracts that are freely 
made and contracts that are adhesive.  The “money now, terms later” 
approach clearly provides businesses (vendors), through the terms 
contained in the pre-meditated standard contract, with more advantages 
over adherents who may already be in the disadvantageous situation.  
Hence, as some have observed, ProCD’s “terms later” rule abandons the 
principle of impartial treatment of the contractual parties.238 
It is conceivable that in many shrink-wrap agreements, the choice 
of law clause will be included.239  Thus, ProCD’s “terms later” doctrine, 
if applied, would make the clause enforceable along with all other terms 
of the contract without considering whether the customer (adherent) has 
effectively assented to the clause.  This indeed helps businesses 
strategically create a setting in which they can act purposefully for their 
own benefit, both from a business and legal perspective.240 
D. UCITA Provision and “Bomb-Shelter” Legislation 
Realizing the rapid growth of the modern digital economy, the 
American Law Institute (ALI) and the N.C.C.U.S.L. endeavored in 1990 
to draft a compute information law known as U.C.C. Article 2B, with an 
attempt to create a set of rules for wrap agreements and other electronic 
licensing arrangements.241  The draft Article 2B, which was finished in 
1998, was intended to deal with the transactions that largely have never 
 237.  See id. 
 237. See id. at 1451. 
 238. See Bern, supra note 20, at 644. 
 239. See Peter Swire, Of Elephants, Mice, and Privacy: International Choice of Law and the 
Internet, 32 INT’L L. 991, 1023 (1998).  See also William Woodward, Finding the Contract in 
Contracts for Law, Forum and Arbitration, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 1-7 (2005). 
 240. See Bern, supra note 20, at 738-39. 
 241. See Harrison, supra note 146, at 912. 
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been covered by the U.C.C.242  This effort, however, failed due to 
vigorous opposition from various sources.243  Then in 1999, the 
N.C.C.U.S.L. turned Article 2B into UCITA, and approved it as a 
uniform law the same year.244  In 2000, UCITA was enacted in 
Maryland and Virginia.245 
As noted, UCITA embraces a provision that allows the parties to 
choose as applicable law to the contract any state law, regardless of the 
relationship between the state whose law is selected and the parties or 
their transactions.246  This provision, on its face, has an effect of 
promoting unfettered party autonomy.  But the problem is that “wrap” 
agreements are mostly adhesive and as such the choice of law clause in 
these agreements is actually made by one party.  Thus, with respect to 
adherents, there will be no autonomy if they are offered no opportunity 
to make a choice. 
The whole issue then is whether there is a reasonable framework 
under which the parties’ assent, especially the adherent’s assent, to the 
terms of a wrap agreement will be obtained.  Under UCITA, a party’s 
assent is manifested if the party has an “opportunity to review” the 
terms, or manifests assent through certain conduct.247  But UCITA is 
vague as to what would constitute an opportunity to review, and 
provides no rule to help ensure that there is such an opportunity.248  
Also, it is unclear whether the assent, as used in UCITA, refers to 
general assent to the terms as a whole or whether it includes specific 
assent to a particular term, e.g. a choice of law clause, as well. 
In fact, although UCITA is claimed to help maintain a contextual 
and balanced approach249 and present a careful blending of law drawn 
 242. See the American Law Institute & National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws, Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B – Licenses, April 15, 1998, at 103. 
 243. Article 2B of U.C.C. was widely criticized as unduly favorable to licensors.  See Harrison, 
supra note 146. 
 244. See AMERICANS FOR FAIR ELECTRONIC COMMERCE TRANSACTIONS, THE HISTORY OF 
UCITA, available at http://www.ucita.com/what_history.html. 
 245. See id. 
 246. One restriction is that with regard to consumer contracts, the “choice is not enforceable . . 
. to the extent it would vary a rule that may not be varied by agreement under the law of the 
jurisdiction whose law would apply . . . in the absence of the agreement.”  See UCITA § 109, supra 
note 29. 
 247. See id. §112(e). 
 248. The “opportunity to review” is stated in UCITA as making the terms “available in a 
manner that ought to call it to the attention of a reasonable person and permit review.”  See id. 
 249. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 491. 
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from a variety of sources,250 it meets great criticism from the major 
consumer advocacy organizations in the United States.  Because UCITA 
is deemed as being, among others, biased in favor of the software 
industry on the ground that numerous provisions in UCITA have 
changed current law to the detriment of consumers,251 many strongly 
oppose its adoption.252 
Perhaps the most defensive response against UCITA is the 
enactment of an anti-UCITA statute, known as “bomb shelter” 
legislation.  Several states have already enacted “bomb shelter” 
legislation.253  The very purpose of such legislation is to shield the 
citizens of a state from UCITA laws adopted in other states, and 
especially to void choice of law or choice of forum provisions in the 
UCITA-driven contracts for statewide residents and business.254  Under 
“bomb shelter” legislation, a choice of law provision will be invalidated 
if the provision requires the wrap agreement to be interpreted according 
to the laws of the state that has adopted UCITA.255 
Hence, although the UCITA choice of law provision seems to favor 
party autonomy and permit a contractual choice of applicable law 
without limitation on relationship, it actually offers one-sided autonomy 
in favor of the software industry.  Therefore, its application is being 
excluded in the states that have passed “bomb shelter” legislation.  The 
major concern is that under UCITA the software licensors could choose 
 250. See Jerry Myers, An Overview of the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 
106 COM. L. J. 275, 347 (2001). 
 251. See Miriam Nisbet, President of AFFECT, May 18, 2004 Letter to Senator Lorraine 
Berry, available at  http://www.ucita.com. 
 252. See id. 
 253. The states that have adopted “bomb shelter” legislation include Iowa (Iowa Code 
§554D.104), North Carolina (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-329), and West Virginia (W. Va. Code §55-8-
15). 
 254. See Mary Baish, Washington Brief (Feb. 7. 2002), at 
http://www.aallnet.org/aallwash/lu042002.html. 
 255. For example, Iowa Code § 554D.125 provides: 
A choice of law provision in a computer information agreement which provides that the 
contract is to be interpreted pursuant to the laws of a state that has enacted the uniform 
computer information transactions Act, as proposed by the national conference of 
commissioners on uniform state laws, or any substantially similar law, is voidable and 
the agreement shall be interpreted pursuant to the laws of this state if the party against 
whom enforcement of the choice of law provision is sought is a resident of this state or 
has its principal place of business located in this state.  For purposes of this subsection, a 
“computer information agreement” means an agreement that would be governed by the 
uniform computer information transactions Act or substantially similar law as enacted in 
the state specified in the choice of law provision if that state’s law were applied to the 
agreement.  
IOWA CODE § 554D.125 (2007) (italics in original). 
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the law of any state they wish to apply to the software license in wrap 
agreements and thus place the users (consumers) at their mercy.256 
“SECOND CHANCE” APPROACH: A PROPOSED MECHANISM FOR A FAIR 
AND MEANINGFUL CHOICE OF LAW BY THE PARTIES IN CONTRACTS OF 
ADHESION 
For purposes of conflict of laws, party autonomy is an 
internationally accepted basic principle applied to contractual choice of 
law.257  It has been well established that the parties have the right to 
decide which law will govern their transactions.258  For instance, in the 
European Union (“EU”), party autonomy is regarded as a fundamental 
right that is essential for the proper functioning of the EU member 
states’ internal market.259  Under Article 3 of the 1980 Rome 
Convention,260 parties are free to choose whichever law they like to 
govern their contracts.261  Even in the United States, there is a rebuttable 
presumption in courts in favor of party autonomy in selecting the 
applicable law to contracts despite various limitations as well as a 
requirement for some connection between the transactions or the parties 
and the chosen law.262 
Again, it is worth emphasizing that the general acceptance of party 
autonomy is premised upon the notion that the choice of law clause is 
freely negotiated and made between parties with equal footing.263  The 
choice of law clause so made represents the true intention of the parties 
 256. See Nisbet, supra note 251. 
 257. See Ian Baxter, International Business and Choice of Law, 36 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 92, 93-
96 (1987). 
 258. See Batiffol, supra note 35, at 68. See also Willis Reese, Contracts and the Restatement of 
Conflict of Laws, Second, 9 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 531, 534 (1960) (stating party autonomy, or the 
power of the parties to choose the law governing a contract, is believed to a firmly established 
principle in most systems of law). 
 259. See H. Verhagen, The Tension Between Party Autonomy and European Union Law: Some 
Observations on Igmar GB Ltd. v. Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc., 51 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 135, 
143 (2002). 
 260. The European Communities: Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations. 1980 O.J. (C 027) 1492-1500. 
 261. See id. Art. 3. 
 262. See RALPH STEINHARDT, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
THE RISE OF INTERMESTIC LAW 229-230 (2002). 
 263. See 2 ERNST RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 367 (Callaghan & 
Comp. 1947) (“[A choice of law] agreement is a true contract, having all requirements of a 
contractual engagement.”). 
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to be voluntarily bound by the law that they have chosen,264 and such 
intention is expressed by the parties, or in certain cases could be 
presumed (or implied) from the terms of contract and the relevant 
surrounding circumstances.265  Generally speaking, in the context of 
choice of law by the parties, the principle of “party autonomy” is viewed 
as the conflict of law aspect of freedom of contract.266 
For contracts of adhesion, however, the parties are obviously not in 
equal positions in terms of negotiating the contractual terms and 
conditions, and there is hardly equal opportunity for the parties to 
manifest their intentions.  Thus, to the extent that the intention of the 
parties should be determinative of the governing law of a contract, it is 
necessary that special attention be called to the choice of law issue if the 
contract involved is adhesive.  It has been suggested that in the law of 
conflicts, we should be careful not to extend rules developed for parties 
with equal bargaining power to contracts in which a party merely 
adheres to the terms conceived by the other party.267 
At a time, the courts of the United States, when dealing with 
contracts that were deemed not to result from equal bargaining, were 
inclined to invalidate choice of law clauses unfavorable to the 
adherents.268  But since Carnival, where the United States Supreme 
Court enforced a clearly adhesive forum selection agreement, a specter 
has been raised that such agreements will be enforced routinely against 
adherents.269  In addition, ProCD attempted to extend “routine 
enforceability” to wrap agreements.  After ProCD, there appeared to 
have developed a presumption that the wrap agreements, though 
adhesive, are enforceable.270 
But whatever the courts’ ruling on the enforceability of contracts of 
adhesion, the courts have not resolved the issue of adhesive choice of 
law.  At first, as noted, Carnival is not a choice of law case and 
therefore, it is inappropriate to analogically apply Carnival to the 
 264. See Note, Conflict of Laws: “Party Autonomy” in Contracts, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 553, 554 
(1957) (Considerable attention on the part of legal scholars has centered around the question of the 
extent to which the intent of the parties should control the applicable law). 
 265. See MORRIS: THE CONFLICT OF LAWS  321-323 (D. McClean ed., Sweet & Maxwell 5th 
ed. 2000). 
 266. See id. at 321. 
 267. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 3, at 1077. 
 268. See id. at 1083.  See also supra note 264, at 575. (“While no particular type of contract 
should be rigidly excluded, the facts of each case should be examined, with a presumption of 
adhesion, in insurance, loan, employment, transportation, and similar contracts.”). 
 269. See Borchers, supra note 203, at 56. 
 270. See Robertson, supra note 116, at 275-276. 
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enforceability of choice of law clauses in contracts of adhesion.  In 
addition, ProCD had the effect of validating “wrap” agreements as a 
whole, but it is clearly not tenable that ProCD is a reasonable legal 
resource when adhesive choice of law becomes an issue, especially in 
the case where consumer’s expectations matter.  Moreover, for many 
years, scholars have been focusing on what differentiates adhesive 
contracts from negotiated contracts, and have not been paying enough 
attention to particular adhesive contract provisions such as choice of 
law.271  Consequently, many key questions concerning the enforceability 
of adhesive choice of law are not even asked in adhesion contract 
cases.272 
The neglect to specifically address the choice of law issue in 
contracts of adhesion may have several causes.  First, contractual choice 
of law is one of the most complicated areas in conflict of laws273 and the 
complexity is being considerably aggravated by the increasing amount 
of business transactions over the internet.274  Similarly, contracts of 
adhesion, particularly the Internet-based form contracts, not only change 
the dynamics of traditional contract formation, but also pose challenges 
to the way contracts are normally dealt with, which requires a rethinking 
of the existing general rules.275 
Second, there is lack of a well-developed framework under which 
the contractual choice of law issue in adhesion contracts will be solved.  
For the party autonomy doctrine itself, it seems settled and decisive in 
theory, but is still deemed as not so clear in application.276  As far as 
contracts of adhesion are concerned, their proper legal treatment remains 
in doubt although they are ubiquitous in modern commercial life.277  In 
addition, the spread of wrap agreements in today’s business transactions 
and the concerns about the risks facing consumers have generated a 
 271. See Woodward, supra note 239, at 46. 
 272. See id. (“Can a choice of law clause be considered ‘unconscionable’ if its effect is to 
deprive a plaintiff of a class action remedy? . . .  Might the hidden effects of a choice of law 
provision violate a consumer’s reasonable expectations?. . . Are choice-of-law clauses binding if 
packed in with the product and seen, if at all, only after purchase? . . . Are they enforceable if they 
appear in browseware?”).  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 273. See Morris Levin, Party Autonomy: Choice-of-Law Clauses in Commercial Contracts, 46 
GEO. L. J. 260 (1958).  See also Albert Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 59 COLUM. 
L. REV. 973 (1959). 
 274. See BRILMAYER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 217, at 840 (“The Internet is believed by 
many to raise intractable choice of law puzzles.”). 
 275. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 432. 
 276. See Robert Johnston, Party Autonomy in Contracts Specifying Foreign Law, 7 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 37, 38 (1966). 
 277. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1174. 
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great deal of debates among lawmakers and theorists on whether there is 
the need for a new set of rules regulating internet form contracts.278 
Third, the judicial practices in dealing with the enforceability of 
adhesion contracts are confusing.  In particular, courts are unclear as to 
how an adhesive choice of law provision should be treated differently 
from a non-adhesive one.  In many cases, courts seem to be influenced 
by Karl Llewellyn’s theory of “blanket assent”279 and presume the 
adherents’ assent to the adhesive terms as long as the terms are not 
unfair or unreasonable in presentation or substance regardless of whether 
the adherents may have ignored the details of the terms.280  In other 
cases, courts simply apply the traditional choice of law rules to the 
adhesive choice of law provision without taking into consideration the 
difference between negotiated contracts and non-negotiated contracts.281 
Once more, it is important to note that the core of party autonomy is 
to ensure that parties are free to provide in the contract that the rule of 
decision should be from the legal system of a designated country, and 
that this designation is respected and applied by the forum.282  It is 
equally important to stress that the autonomy may only be exercised 
when the parties are able to make a fair and meaningful choice as to the 
law they wish to govern their transactions.  Obviously, in contracts of 
adhesion, a fair and meaningful choice as such is, in general, absent. 
Therefore, it is necessary to develop a mechanism under which the 
parties to an adhesive contract will be granted an equal opportunity to 
 278. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 430. 
 279. See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 369-370 
(1960). For more discussion about Llewellyn’s “blanket assent” theory and its impact, see Rakoff, 
supra note 2, at 1198-1206. 
 280. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 455. 
 281. For example, in Davidson & Associates, Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir. 
1964), plaintiff sued defendant for, among others, breach of End User License Agreement 
(E.U.L.A.).  Under the choice of law provision on the EULA, the license agreement shall be deemed 
to have been made and executed in the State of California and any dispute arising hereunder shall be 
resolved in accordance with the law of California.  The parties, however, disputed whether the 
contract should be governed by Missouri Law or California Law. Plaintiff was a California 
corporation and defendant company was based in St. Peters, Missouri.  In reaching its decision for 
the application of California Law, the U.S. District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division held that 
when a contract contains a choice of law provision, the validity of that provision is governed by 
section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971).  Despite defendant’s argument 
about the adhesive nature of the contract, the court opined that the relevant inquiry is whether the 
issue involved here is one that the parties could have resolved by mutual agreement.  The court then 
concluded that under Missouri Law and the Restatement, this court would give to the reasonable 
expectations of the parties to the agreement and apply the law of the state chosen by the parties, 
California. 
 282. See Baxter, supra note 257, at 112. 
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make a fair and meaningful choice of law that governs the contract.  For 
this purpose, this article proposes a “second chance” approach that is 
aimed at providing adherents with a meaningful way to express their 
assent to the choice of law contained in contracts of adhesion, whereby 
they will be bound. 
Under the “second chance” approach, if an adhesive contract 
contains a choice of law clause or there is an adhesive choice of law 
agreement,283 such clause or agreement will not be enforced until the 
adherent expresses no objection to the choice so made.  In other words, 
if there is a dispute over the choice of law clause or agreement that is 
adhesive, the clause or agreement shall be set aside and the parties shall 
be allowed to make a new choice.  To be more illustrative, the “second 
chance” approach consists of the following aspects: 
1. The choice of law clause in an adhesion contract or an adhesive 
choice of law agreement shall not be enforced unless the adherent is 
aware of the choice and makes no express objection to it; 
2.  As a general rule, an adherent shall have the opportunity to be 
notified of the choice of law contained in the adhesion contract.  The 
adherent’s objection will be assumed if no notice is given.  The 
opportunity for notice, however, could be waived by the adherent, and 
the waiver, if made expressly, will be regarded as the adherent’s 
agreement to the choice; 
3.  If an adherent challenges the choice of law clause or agreement, the 
clause or agreement shall be set aside, and the parties may negotiate to 
choose the governing law for the contract; 
4.  If the parties fail to make the choice after negotiation, the contract 
shall be deemed to have no choice of law clause or agreement, and the 
choice of law rules for the determination of governing law in the 
absence of parties’ choice shall be applied. 
In short, the “second chance” approach introduces a “valid but not 
necessarily enforceable” mechanism to help protect the reasonable 
interest of adherents with regard to the law to which they will be subject.  
On the one hand, the “second chance” approach does not presume that 
the adhesive choice of law clause is invalid.  On the other hand, the 
 283. Choice of law clause is the provision contained in the contract; while choice of law 
agreement is normally referred to as a provision separated from the text of the contract, but made 
for the contract. 
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approach provides a “waiting period” or “buffer time” before the clause 
becomes enforceable.  During the waiting period, the adherents will have 
the chance to either agree to the choice or to reject it.  In the meantime, 
the parties may negotiate for a new choice. 
As discussed, in respect to the adhesive choice of law clause, the 
common concern is that there is lack of free negotiation or there is no 
opportunity for the parties to freely negotiate.  The “second chance” 
approach will help solve this issue by allowing adherents to take a 
specific look at the choice of law clause contained in contracts of 
adhesion and make their own decision.  Through the “second chance”, 
the free negotiation between the parties will be achieved and the parties’ 
autonomy will be exercised in a reasonable way as to the choice of law.  
In addition, the “second chance” approach provides a scheme under 
which adherents, with respect to governing law, will not be stranded by 
the “take-it-or-leave-it” deals they have entered into through a so-called 
“blanket assent” or by simply clicking on “I agree.” 
Once again, it should be noted that the choice of law clause, though 
auxiliary to the main contract,284 has its uniqueness in terms of legal 
consequences affecting the parties285 and, therefore, deserves particular 
attention.  Quite often, in regular contract cases, the choice of law is 
being separated out from the main contract and dealt with individually.  
In the past, United States courts have expressly recognized the 
desirability of special treatment for choice of law stipulations in 
adhesion contracts.286  Despite the fact that such judicial desirability 
seems unclear at the present, courts sometimes still view the choice of 
law issue separately from the main contract.287 
As mentioned, in Milanovich, the D.C. Circuit Court footnoted a 
concept of “reasonable communication” to the enforceability of choice 
of law clauses printed on passenger ticket.  According to the Court, 
whether the choice of law clause was validly incorporated into the 
passenger ticket is a preliminary question to the determination of 
whether such a clause should be honored, and the incorporation was 
dependent on whether the clause had been “reasonably communicated” 
 284. See RABEL, supra note 263, at 367. 
 285. See Reese, supra note 258, at 534 (“Parties do not customarily enter contracts without 
giving thought to the possible legal consequences of doing so.”).  See also Levin, supra note 273, at 
260 (“Everyone who engages in a multi-state contract . . . is affected by the perplexing question of 
determining the law governing the contract.”). 
 286. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 273, at 977. 
 287. In Internet Gateway, 334 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir. 1964), the court viewed the contract as a 
whole under the doctrine of “unconscionability” but singled out the choice of law clause and 
examined it under the Restatement approach. 
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to the passenger.288  In this case, the court seemed to infer that the choice 
of law issue requires special consideration. 
Unfortunately, the Milanovich case did not specifically address the 
“preliminary question” nor did it imply what would amount to 
reasonable communication or how it is to be determined.  Nevertheless, 
the case raised a legitimate concern about a reasonable communication 
with adherents as to adhesive choice of law clause.  The underlying 
notion seems to be that without reasonable communication there would 
be no real assent from adherents to such a clause. 
In this respect, the “second chance” approach will help ensure that 
the choice of law clause in contracts of adhesion will be effectively 
communicated to adherents in a reasonable and meaningful manner.  
Even in the case where the adhesive contract itself is presumed 
enforceable, the choice of law clause will not be enforced unless and 
until adherents agree after the reasonable communication.  This rule 
would protect adherents, in most cases consumers, from being dragged 
into a legal system they are not aware of in advance. 
An obvious advantage of the “second chance” approach is to 
provide the adherents with double insurance in contracts of adhesion.  At 
the beginning, an adherent may argue against the enforceability of the 
contract as a whole.  If the argument fails, the adherent may then focus 
on the choice of law clause in the contract and decide whether or not to 
be bound by it because different law may lead to different results.  The 
term “insurance” as used here means to enable the adherents to know of 
their choice and to predict the outcome. 
Another advantage of the “second chance” approach is to avoid the 
flaws that are imbedded in the idea of fictitious “blanket assent.”289  It 
will also help reduce the risks facing consumers in “wrap” agreements 
that they are deemed to have entered into by clicking an icon.  Pursuant 
to the “second chance” approach, the enforceability of an adhesive 
choice of law clause requires a specific assent from adherents.  
Therefore, even if a consumer is held to have expressed assent to a fine 
printed boilerplate contract or a wrap agreement, such assent does not 
 288. Milanovich v. Costa Crociere, S.p.A., 954 F. 2d 763, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 289. The “blanket assent” is premised on the assumption that most adherents agree to be bound 
by unknown terms as long as the terms are not “unreasonable or indecent.”  See Rakoff, supra note 
2, at 1200. But it is highly questionable as to whether the “blanket assent” represents the “true 
assent” of the parties, even though the terms are not unreasonable from an objective point of view.  
Also there is a doubt that it is fair to hold the adherents bound by the terms unknown to them no 
matter how reasonable the terms are (not to mention that the seemingly reasonable terms may not be 
reasonable if reviewed subjectively). 
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apply to the choice of law clause or agreement unless the assent is 
specifically given. 
In addition, the “second chance” approach helps balance the 
interests of businesses and consumers and, thus, helps realize the goal of 
consumer protection in contracts of adhesion.  The “second chance” 
approach does not purport to invalidate the adhesive choice of law 
clause nor does it deny the legitimacy of the businesses’ decision to 
insert a choice of law clause in their favor.  In the meantime, it protects 
adherents because the adherents have the opportunity to make a 
reasonable choice.  In this respect, if the “second chance” approach is in 
place, there might well be no need to enact any “bomb shelter” 
legislation. 
CONCLUSION 
Contractual choice of law in contracts of adhesion is indeed an 
issue that deserves particular attention.  To the extent that more and 
more business transactions take place online, the need for developing a 
framework under which such issue will be effectively handled seems to 
become eminent because most of the online business activities more or 
less involve the standard form contracts that are adhesive in nature.  A 
predominant question in this respect is how to make it possible for 
adherents to meaningfully select the law to which they will be subject in 
the contracts adhesive to them. 
Under the existing choice of law rule, the parties have the 
autonomy to stipulate in their contract the law of a particular state or 
nation to govern the contract and the choice of law by the parties will be 
honored as required by the principle of party autonomy, except for the 
limitations imposed upon the parties by the law pertaining to questions 
that lie beyond the parties’ contractual power.290  Such autonomy, 
however, does not readily exist in contracts of adhesion, not because of 
the operation of law but because of the one-sided structure of such 
contracts.  From this perspective, the principle of party autonomy, as 
Ehrenzweig once pointed out, has indeed no place in contracts of 
adhesion.291 
Given that the contractual choice of law in contracts of adhesion 
has departed from the traditional notion of the party autonomy doctrine 
that is designed to give the parties equal power to freely determine the 
 290. See Reese, supra note 258, at 535. 
 291. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 3, at 1090. 
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law by which they agree to be bound,292 the autonomy of the parties with 
regard to the choice of law in such contracts should be viewed in a non-
traditional way.  It might be debatable whether a new set of rules should 
be adopted, but there arises an increasing demand for a new mechanism 
under which the parties, adherents in particular, could make a fair and 
meaningful choice of the law that will govern their contract. 
The “second chance” approach is the mechanism as such.  It not 
only recognizes the validity of choice of law clause in contacts of 
adhesion, but also provides the adherents with an option either to adhere 
or not to adhere to the clause.  The approach is intended to help establish 
a general rule that a choice of law clause in a contract of adhesion shall 
not be deemed enforceable prior to affirmation of the true assent of 
adherent. 
 292. See Hessel Yntema, “Autonomy” in Choice of Law, 1 AM. J. COMP. L. 341, 343-345 
(1952) (The Meaning of “Autonomy”). 
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